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Measuring Power and Satisfaction in Societies with Opinion Leaders: An Axiomatization

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Author Info

  • Rene van den Brink

    ()
    (VU University Amsterdam)

  • Agnieszka Rusinowska

    ()
    (Universite Paris I Pantheon-Sorbonne)

  • Frank Steffen

    ()
    (The University of Liverpool Management School (ULMS))

Abstract

A well-known model in sociology and marketing is that of opinion leadership. Opinion leaders are actors who are able to affect the behavior of their followers. Hence, opinion leaders have some power over their followers, and they can exercise this power by influencing their followers choice of action. We study a two-action model for a society with opinion leaders. We assume that each member of the society has an inclination to choose one of these actions and that the collective choice is made by simple majority of the actions chosen by each member. For this model we axiomatize satisfaction and power scores, which allow us to investigate the effects of different opinion leader-follower structures.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 11-058/1.

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Date of creation: 24 Mar 2011
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20110058

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Web page: http://www.tinbergen.nl

Related research

Keywords: Collective choice; follower; influence; opinion leader; power; satisfaction; axiomatization;

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References

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  1. Michel Grabisch & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2010. "A model of influence with an ordered set of possible actions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 69(4), pages 635-656, October.
  2. Tchantcho, Bertrand & Lambo, Lawrence Diffo & Pongou, Roland & Engoulou, Bertrand Mbama, 2008. "Voters' power in voting games with abstention: Influence relation and ordinal equivalence of power theories," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 335-350, September.
  3. René Brink, 2010. "Axiomatizations of Banzhaf permission values for games with a permission structure," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 39(3), pages 445-466, July.
  4. anonymous, 1996. "The power to make a difference," Banking and Community Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, issue Apr, pages 6 & 8.
  5. Lehrer, E, 1988. "An Axiomatization of the Banzhaf Value," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 89-99.
  6. Granovetter, Mark & Soong, Roland, 1986. "Threshold models of interpersonal effects in consumer demand," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 83-99, March.
  7. MoshÊ Machover & Dan S. Felsenthal, 1997. "Ternary Voting Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 335-351.
  8. Dan S. Felsenthal & Moshé Machover, 2002. "Models and Reality: the Curios Case of the Absent Abstention," Homo Oeconomicus, Institute of SocioEconomics, vol. 19, pages 297-310.
  9. Annick Laruelle & Federico Valenciano, 2005. "Assessing success and decisiveness in voting situations," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 171-197, January.
  10. repec:hal:cesptp:hal-00756720 is not listed on IDEAS
  11. Ren� van den Brink & Frank Steffen, 2012. "On the Measurement of Success and Satisfaction," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-030/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  12. René van den Brink & Frank Steffen, 2007. "Positional Power in Hierarchies," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 07-038/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  13. Haller, Hans, 1994. "Collusion Properties of Values," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 261-81.
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Cited by:
  1. Maurice Koster & Sascha Kurz & Ines Lindner & Stefan Napel, 2013. "The Prediction Value," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 13-188/II, Tinbergen Institute.

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