Balancing the Bids, Solutions for Unit Price Auctions
AbstractMany organizations use procurement tenders to buy large amounts of goods and services. Especially in the public sector the use of these reverse auctions has grown rapidly over the past decades. For the (reverse) unit price auction experience as well as theory have shown that they can attract skewed/unbalanced bids, i.e. bids where the price structure is distorted to take advantage of estimation errors. This paper shows that by either allowing for some secrecy or post tender competition, incentives in unit price auction change in such a way that can make bid skewing disappear.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 11-047/1.
Date of creation: 01 Mar 2011
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unit price auctions; procurement; skewed bids; unbalanced bidding; post tender competition; split award auction;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- L38 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Public Policy
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