The Emergence of Social Structure: Employer Information Networks in an Experimental Labor Market
AbstractWe use laboratory experiments to investigate how employers develop social structures for sharing information about the trustworthiness of job candidates, when worker opportunism is possible. The experimental data show that substantial information sharing emerges. Two types of information networks are observed. One consists of 'anonymity networks' where information is anonymously and voluntarily provided as a collective good for all employers to use. The other type is a 'reciprocity network' where information sharing is driven by the rewarding of previously given information by the requestor. In both types, the extent of information sharing depends on the costs of providing it. Moreover, information sharing enables employers to recruit trustworthy workers which creates a high quality of trading, benefiting both employer and worker.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 11-032/1.
Date of creation: 11 Feb 2011
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Social structure; Information networks; Recruitment; Experiments;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic Stratification
- J23 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Demand
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-02-26 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2011-02-26 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-EXP-2011-02-26 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-ICT-2011-02-26 (Information & Communication Technologies)
- NEP-LAB-2011-02-26 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-NET-2011-02-26 (Network Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2011-02-26 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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