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The Herodotus Paradox

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  • Michael R. Baye

    (Indiana University)

  • Dan Kovenock

    (University of Iowa)

  • Casper G. de Vries

    (Erasmus University Rotterdam)

Abstract

This discussion paper led to a publication in 'Games and Economic Behavior' , 74(1), 399-406. The Babylonian bridal auction, described by Herodotus, is regarded as one of the earliest uses of an auction in history. Yet, to our knowledge, the literature lacks a formal equilibrium analysis of this auction. We provide such an analysis for the twoplayer case with complete and incompete information, and in so doing identify what we call the "Herodotus Paradox".

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 10-090/2.

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Date of creation: 02 Sep 2010
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20100090

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Web page: http://www.tinbergen.nl

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Keywords: second price; transfer to loser;

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References

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  1. Michael R. Baye & Dan Kovenock & Casper G. de Vries, 2008. "Contests with Rank-Order Spillovers," Working Papers 2008-20, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
  2. Maskin, Eric S & Riley, John G, 1984. "Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1473-1518, November.
  3. Michael R. Baye & Dan Kovenock & Casper G. de Vries, 2010. "The Herodotus Paradox," Working Papers 2010-16, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
  4. repec:dgr:uvatin:2010090 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. Bhattacharyya, Sugato & Lipman, Barton L, 1995. "Ex ante versus Interim Rationality and the Existence of Bubbles," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 469-94, November.
  6. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
  7. Riley, John G & Samuelson, William F, 1981. "Optimal Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 381-92, June.
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Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. An analysis of the oldest auction in history
    by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2011-01-05 15:52:00
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Cited by:
  1. Michael R. Baye & Dan Kovenock & Casper G. de Vries, 2010. "The Herodotus Paradox," Working Papers 2010-16, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.

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  1. Economic Logic blog

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