But Some Neutrally Stable Strategies are More Neutrally Stable than Others
Abstract
For games in which there is no evolutionarily stable strategy, it can be useful to look for neutrally stable ones. In extensive form games for instance there is typically no evolutionary stable strategy, while there may very well be a neutrally stable one. Such strategies can however still be relatively stable or unstable, depending on whether or not the neutral mutants it allows for - which by definition do not have a selective advantage themselves - can open doors for other mutants, that do have a selective advantage. This paper defines robustness against indirect invasions in order to be able to discern between those two very different situations. Robustness against indirect invasions turns out to come with a very natural setwise generalisation of evolutionary stability; we prove that if a strategy is robust against indirect invasions, then this strategy and its (indirect) neutral mutants form a set that is asymptotically stable in the replicator dynamics.Download Info
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.Bibliographic Info
Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 10-033/1.Length:
Date of creation: 19 Mar 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20100033
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.tinbergen.nl
Related research
Keywords: Robustness against indirect invasions; neutrally stable strategy; evolutionarily stable strategy; extensive form game;Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-02-26 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2011-02-26 (Game Theory)
References
References listed on IDEASPlease report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Matthijs van Veelen, 2007. "Evolution of Strategies in Repeated Games with Discounting," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-115/1, Tinbergen Institute.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Matthijs van Veelen & Julian Garcia, 2010. "In and Out of Equilibrium: Evolution of Strategies in Repeated Games with Discounting," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 10-037/1, Tinbergen Institute.
Lists
This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20100033For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Antoine Maartens (+31 626 - 160 892)).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.