Preopening and Equilibrium Selection
AbstractWe introduce a form of pre-play communication that we call "preopening". During the preopening, players announce their tentative actions to be played in the underlying game. Announcements are made using a posting system which is subject to stochastic failures. Posted actions are publicly observable and players payoffs only depend on the opening outcome, i.e. the action profile that is posted at the end of the preopening phase. We show that when the posting failures hit players idiosyncratically all equilibria of the preopening game lead to the same opening outcome that corresponds to the most "sensible" pure Nash equilibrium of the underlying game. By contrast preopening does not operate an equilibrium selection when posting failure hits players simultaneously.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 10-023/2.
Date of creation: 22 Feb 2010
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Preopening; equilibrium selection; bargaining; cheap talk;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- G1 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-09-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2010-09-03 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-GTH-2010-09-03 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2010-09-03 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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"Commitment Robust Equilibria and Endogenous Timing,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
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- Damme, E.E.C. van & Hurkens, J.P.M., 1996. "Commitment robust equilibria and endogenous timing," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-73412, Tilburg University.
- Van Damme, E. & Hurkens, S., 1993. "Commitment Robust Equilibria and Endogenous Timing," Papers 9356, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
- Dutta, Prajit K., 2012. "Coordination need not be a problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 519-534.
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