Identification of Voters with Interest Groups improves the Electoral Chances of the Challenger
AbstractThis discussion paper led to a publication in 'Mathematical Social Sciences' 60(3), 210-16. Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that, by coordinating voting behavior,these interest groups increase the winning set, which is defined as the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the incumbent. Therefore interest groups enhance the probability of the challenger winning the election.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 09-095/1.
Date of creation: 11 Nov 2009
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Spatial voting models; electoral competition; winning set; interest groups;
Other versions of this item:
- Sadiraj, Vjollca & Tuinstra, Jan & van Winden, Frans, 2010. "Identification of voters with interest groups improves the electoral chances of the challenger," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 210-216, November.
- Vjollca Sadiraj & Jan Tuinstra & Frans Van Winden, 2010. "Identification of Voters with Interest Groups Improves the Electoral Chances of the Challenger," CESifo Working Paper Series 3014, CESifo Group Munich.
- Vjollca Sadiraj & Jan Tuinstra & Frans van Winden, 2010. "Identification of Voters with Interest Groups Improves the Electoral Chances of the Challenger," Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series 2010-05, Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-05-15 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2010-05-15 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2010-05-15 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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