Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Stone Age Equilibrium

Contents:

Author Info

  • Harold Houba

    (VU University Amsterdam)

  • Hans-Peter Weikard

    (Wageningen University, and Mansholt Graduate School)

Abstract

We introduce the notion of a stone age equilibrium to study societies in which property rights are absent, bilateral exchange is either coercive or voluntary, and relative strength governs power relations in coercive exchange. We stress the importance of free disposal of goods which allows for excess holdings larger than consumption, thereby modelling the power to withhold goods from others. Under complete, transitive, continuous and strictly-convex preferences, stone age equilibria exist. The maximum of the lexicographic welfare function in which agents are ranked by descending strength always corresponds to a stone age equilibrium. Every stone age equilibrium is weakly Pareto efficient.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://papers.tinbergen.nl/09092.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 09-092/1.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 04 Nov 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20090092

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.tinbergen.nl

Related research

Keywords: Power; Exchange Economy; Coercive Trade; Voluntary Trade; Power to Take;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Dieter Bös & Martin Kolmar, 2000. "Anarchy, Efficiency and Redistribution," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse10_2000, University of Bonn, Germany.
  2. Matthew J. Baker, 2003. "An Equilibrium Conflict Model of Land Tenure in Hunter-Gatherer Societies," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(1), pages 124-173, February.
  3. Ansink, Erik & Weikard, Hans-Peter, 2009. "Contested water rights," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 247-260, June.
  4. Muthoo, Abhinay, 2004. "A model of the origins of basic property rights," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 288-312, November.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. Even coercion is Pareto efficient
    by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2010-07-05 14:10:00
  2. Poverty & attitudes, chickens & eggs
    by chris dillow in Stumbling and Mumbling on 2010-05-20 12:47:09
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Erik Ansink & Michael Gengenbach & Hans-Peter Weikard, 2012. "River Sharing and Water Trade," Working Papers 2012.17, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.

Lists

This item is featured on the following reading lists or Wikipedia pages:
  1. Economic Logic blog

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20090092. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Antoine Maartens (+31 626 - 160 892)).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.