The Effects of Leniency on Maximal Cartel Pricing
AbstractWe analyze maximal cartel prices in infinitely-repeated oligopoly models under leniency where fines are linked to illegal gains, as often outlined in existing antitrust regulation, and detection probabilities depend on the degree of collusion. We introduce cartel culture that describes how likely cartels persist after each conviction. Our analysis disentangles the effects of traditional antitrust regulation, leniency, and cartel strategies. Without rewards to the strictly-first reporter, leniency cannot reduce maximal cartel prices below those under traditional regulation. Moreover, in order to avoid adverse effects fine reductions should be moderate in case of multiple reporters. Our results extend the current literature and partially support existing leniency programs.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 09-081/1.
Date of creation: 25 Sep 2009
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Cartel; Antitrust; Competition Policy; Leniency Program; Self-reporting; Repeated Game;
Other versions of this item:
- Houba, H.E.D. & Motchenkova, E. & Wen, Q., 2009. "The Effects of Leniency on Maximal Cartel Pricing," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center 2009-038, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-10-31 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2009-10-31 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2009-10-31 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2009-10-31 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MIC-2009-10-31 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-REG-2009-10-31 (Regulation)
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- Hüschelrath, Kai & Veith, Tobias, 2011. "The impact of cartelization on pricing dynamics: Evidence from the German cement industry," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Zentrum fÃ¼r EuropÃ¤ische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research 11-067, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
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