Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Lobbying of Firms by Voters

Contents:

Author Info

  • Matthias Dahm

    ()
    (Universitat Rovira i Virgili)

  • Robert Dur

    ()
    (Erasmus University Rotterdam, CESifo, IZA)

  • Amihai Glazer

    ()
    (University of California, Irvine)

Abstract

A firm may induce voters or elected politicians to support a policy it favors by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district whose voters or representatives support the policy. In equilibrium, no one vote may be decisive, and the policy may gain strong support though the majority of districts suffer from adoption of the program. When votes reveal information about the district, the firm's implicit promise or threat can be credible.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://papers.tinbergen.nl/09068.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 09-068/1.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 31 Jul 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20090068

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.tinbergen.nl

Related research

Keywords: Lobbying; voting; special interests; influence;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Rasmusen, Eric, 1993. " Lobbying When the Decisionmaker Can Acquire Independent Information," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 77(4), pages 899-913, December.
  2. Chappell, Henry W, Jr, 1982. "Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting: A Simultaneous Probit-Tobit Model," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 64(1), pages 77-83, February.
  3. Stephen Ansolabehere & John M. de Figueiredo & James M. Snyder Jr, 2003. "Why is There so Little Money in U.S. Politics?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(1), pages 105-130, Winter.
  4. Bennedsen, Morten & Feldmann, Sven E., 2000. "Informational Lobbying And Political Contributions," Working Papers 08-2000, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics.
  5. Matthias Dahm & Nicolas Porteiro, 2005. "Informational Lobbying under the Shadow of Political Pressure," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1409, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  6. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-51, November.
  7. Luis Corchon & Matthias Dahm, 2007. "Foundations For Contest Success Functions," Economics Working Papers we070401, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
  8. Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1986. "Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 101(1), pages 1-31, February.
  9. Ernesto Dal Bo, 2000. "Bribing Voters," Economics Series Working Papers 39, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  10. Austen-Smith, David, 1998. "Allocating Access for Information and Contributions," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(2), pages 277-303, October.
  11. Snyder, James M, Jr, 1990. "Campaign Contributions as Investments: The U.S. House of Representatives, 1980-1986," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1195-1227, December.
  12. Thomas Schwartz, 1987. "Your vote counts on account of the way it is counted: An institutional solution to the paradox of not voting," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 54(2), pages 101-121, January.
  13. Stephen Ansolabehere & John M. de Figueiredo & James M. Snyder, 2003. "Why Is There So Little Money in Politics?," NBER Working Papers 9409, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. Lohmann, Susanne, 1995. " Information, Access, and Contributions: A Signaling Model of Lobbying," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 85(3-4), pages 267-84, December.
  15. Grossman, Gene & Helpman, Elhanan, 1993. "Protection for Sale," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 827, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  16. Lapp, Miriam, 1999. " Incorporating Groups into Rational Choice Explanations of Turnout: An Empirical Test," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 98(1-2), pages 171-85, January.
  17. Raff, Horst & Srinivasan, Krishna, 1998. "Tax incentives for import-substituting foreign investment:: Does signaling play a role?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 167-193, February.
  18. B. Douglas Bernheim & Antonio Rangel & Luis Rayo, 2006. "The Power of the Last Word in Legislative Policy Making," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 74(5), pages 1161-1190, 09.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20090068. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Antoine Maartens (+31 626 - 160 892)).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.