Lobbying of Firms by Voters
AbstractA firm may induce voters or elected politicians to support a policy it favors by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district whose voters or representatives support the policy. In equilibrium, no one vote may be decisive, and the policy may gain strong support though the majority of districts suffer from adoption of the program. When votes reveal information about the district, the firm's implicit promise or threat can be credible.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 09-068/1.
Date of creation: 31 Jul 2009
Date of revision:
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Web page: http://www.tinbergen.nl
Lobbying; voting; special interests; influence;
Other versions of this item:
- Dahm, Matthias & Dur, Robert & Glazerz, Amihai, 2009. "Lobbying of Firms by Voters," Working Papers 2072/43869, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
- Matthias Dahm & Robert Dur & Amihai Glazer, 2009. "Lobbying of Firms by Voters," Working Papers 080926, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-08-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2009-08-16 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-CTA-2009-08-16 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-GTH-2009-08-16 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2009-08-16 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-POL-2009-08-16 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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