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Measuring Power And Satisfaction in Societies with Opinion Leaders: Dictator and Opinion Leader Properties

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Author Info

  • Ren� van den Brink

    (VU University Amsterdam)

  • Agnieszka Rusinowska

    (Universit� Lumi�re Lyon)

  • Frank Steffen

    (The University of Liverpool - Management School (ULMS))

Abstract

A well known and established model in communication policy in sociology and marketing is that of opinion leadership. Opinion leaders are actors in a society who are able to affect the behavior of other members called followers. Hence, opinion leaders might have a considerable impact on the behavior of markets and other social agglomerations being made up of individual actors choosing among different alternatives. For marketing or policy purposes it is interesting to investigate the effect of different opinion leader-follower structures in markets or other collective decision-making situations in a society. We study a two-action model in which the members of a society are to choose one action, for instance, to buy or not to buy a certain joint product, or to vote yes or no on a specific proposal. Each of the actors has an inclination to choose one of the actions. By definition opinion leaders have some power over their followers, and they exercise this power by influencing the behavior of their followers, i.e. their choice of action. After all actors have chosen their actions, a decision-making mechanism determines the collective choice resulting from the individual choices. Using bipartite digraphs we introduce satisfaction and power scores which allow us to analyze the actors' satisfaction and power with respect to the collective choice for societies with different opinion leader-follower structures. Moreover, we study common dictator and opinion leader properties of the above scores and illustrate our findings for a society with five members.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 09-052/1.

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Date of creation: 11 Jun 2009
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20090052

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Related research

Keywords: Bipartite digraph; influence; inclination; collective choice; opinion leader; follower; satisfaction; power; dictator properties; opinion leader properties;

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References

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Cited by:
  1. Michel Grabisch & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2010. "Different Approaches to Influence Based on Social Networks and Simple Games," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00514850, HAL.
  2. Ren� van den Brink, 2009. "Comparable Axiomatizations of the Myerson Value, the Restricted Banzhaf Value, Hierarchical Outcomes and the Average Tree Solution for Cycle-Free Graph Restricted Games," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute 09-108/1, Tinbergen Institute.

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