Pros and Cons of ‘Backing Winners’ in Innovation Policy
AbstractIn the economics profession there is a fierce debate whether industrial and innovation policy should be targeted to specific sectors or firms. This paper discusses the welfare effects of such targeted policies from the perspective of strategic game theory of the firm. A theoretical case for picking winners through a preferential innovative policy is discussed in a third-market international trade model, which is shown to hold without evoking retaliation from foreign competitors. However, in practice information uncertainties remain a concern. The question whether in this case ‘backing winners’ is a wise policy option depends on the characteristics of the information asymmetries and on the extent the government is able to design selection procedures which minimize the transaction costs that may be caused from the market participants’ opportunistic behavior.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 09-012/3.
Date of creation: 17 Feb 2009
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Innovation policy; R&D subsidies; strategic trade policy; asymmetric information; spill-over effects;
Other versions of this item:
- Jo, Seung-gyu & den Butter, Frank A. G., 2009. "Pros and Cons of Backing Winners in Innovation Policy," MPRA Paper 17658, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
- O24 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - Trade Policy; Factor Movement; Foreign Exchange Policy
- O32 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-03-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2009-03-14 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CTA-2009-03-14 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-INO-2009-03-14 (Innovation)
- NEP-MIC-2009-03-14 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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