Maximal Cartel Pricing and Leniency Programs
AbstractFor a general class of oligopoly models with price competition, we analyze the impact of ex-ante leniency programs in antitrust regulation on the endogenous maximal-sustainable cartel price. This impact depends upon industry characteristics including its cartel culture. Our analysis disentangles the effects of traditional antitrust regulation and the leniency program. Ex-ante leniency programs are effective if and only if these offer substantial rewards to the self-reporting firm. This is in contrast to currently employed programs that are therefore ineffective.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 08-120/1.
Date of creation: 17 Dec 2008
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Cartel; Antitrust Policy; Antitrust Law; Antitrust regulation; Leniency program; Self-reporting; repeated game;
Other versions of this item:
- Houba, H.E.D. & Motchenkova, E. & Wen, Q., 2008. "Maximal Cartel Pricing and Leniency Programs," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center 2008-046, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-01-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2009-01-17 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2009-01-17 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2009-01-17 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-LAW-2009-01-17 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2009-01-17 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-REG-2009-01-17 (Regulation)
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