Gift Exchange in the Workplace

This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data

Gift Exchange in the Workplace

Author Info

Robert Dur () (Erasmus University Rotterdam, and CESifo)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Robert Dur

Abstract

We develop a model of manager-employee relationships where employees care more for their manager when they are more convinced that their manager cares for them. Managers can signal their altruistic feelings towards their employees in two ways: by offering a generous wage and by giving attention. Contrary to the traditional gift-exchange hypothesis, we show that altruistic managers may offer lower wages and nevertheless build up better social-exchange relationships with their employees than egoistic managers do. In such equilibria, a low wage signals to employees that the manager has something else to offer -- namely, a lot of attention -- which will induce the employee to stay at the firm and work hard. Our predictions are well in line with some recent empirical findings about gift exchange in the field.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 08-082/1.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 03 Sep 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20080082

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.tinbergen.nl/

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Walther Schoonenberg).

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
M50 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - General
M54 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Management
M55 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Contracting Devices

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2008-09-20 (All new papers)
NEP-CBE-2008-09-20 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
NEP-EVO-2008-09-20 (Evolutionary Economics)
NEP-EXP-2008-09-20 (Experimental Economics)
NEP-LAB-2008-09-20 (Labour Economics)
NEP-SOC-2008-09-20 (Social Norms & Social Capital)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, . "Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocitys," IEW - Working Papers iewwp040, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, 2000. "Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
- Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter, 2000. "Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 159-181, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Uri Gneezy & John A List, 2006. "Putting Behavioral Economics to Work: Testing for Gift Exchange in Labor Markets Using Field Experiments," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(5), pages 1365-1384, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Uri Gneezy & John A. List, 2006. "Putting Behavioral Economics to Work: Testing for Gift Exchange in Labor Markets Using Field Experiments," NBER Working Papers 12063, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Akerlof, George A, 1982. "Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 97(4), pages 543-69, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Heike Hennig-Schmidt & Bettina Rockenbach & Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 2008. "In Search of Workers' Real Effort Reciprocity - A Field and a Laboratory Experiment," Discussion Papers 238, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Heike Hennig-Schmidt & Bettina Rockenbach & Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 2005. "In Search of Worker’s Real Effort Reciprocity – A Field and a Laboratory Experiment," Artefactual Field Experiments 0056, The Field Experiments Website. [Downloadable!]
- Heike Hennig-Schmidt & Bettina Rockenbach & Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 2005. "In Search of Workers' Real Effort Reciprocity - A Field and a Laboratory Experiment," Discussion Papers 55, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
Prendergast, Canice & Stole, Lars, 2001. "The non-monetary nature of gifts," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(10), pages 1793-1810, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Fehr, Ernst & Kirchsteiger, George & Riedl, Arno, 1993. "Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 108(2), pages 437-59, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Tore Ellingsen & Magnus Johannesson, 2008. "Pride and Prejudice: The Human Side of Incentive Theory," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 990-1008, June. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Ellingsen, Tore & Johannesson, Magnus, 2006. "Pride and Prejudice: The Human Side of Incentive Theory," CEPR Discussion Papers 5768, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Campbell, Carl M, III & Kamlani, Kunal S, 1997. "The Reasons for Wage Rigidity: Evidence from a Survey of Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(3), pages 759-89, August.

Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Bruno S. Frey & Susanne Neckermann, 2009. "Academics Appreciate Awards - A New Aspect of Incentives in Research," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Bruno S. Frey & Susanne Neckermann, 2008. "Academics Appreciate Awards. A New Aspect of Incentives in Research," IEW - Working Papers iewwp400, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
- Bruno S. Frey & Susanne Neckermann, 2008. "Academics Appreciate Awards. A New Aspect of Incentives in Research," CREMA Working Paper Series 2008-32, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA). [Downloadable!]

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Did you know? RePEc stands for Research Papers in Economics.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-19.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.