The Unique-lowest Sealed-bid Auction
AbstractUnique-lowest sealed-bid auctions are auctions in which participation is endogenous and the winning bid is the lowest bid among all unique bids. Such auctions admit very many Nash equilibria (NEs) in pure and mixed strategies. The two-bidders' auction is similar to the Hawk-Dove game, which motivates to study symmetric NEs: Properties and comparative statics are derived and the symmetric NE with the lowest expected gains is the maximin in symmetric strategies, which allows computation through a mathematical program. Simulations provide numerical evidence that the symmetric NE with the lowest expected gains is the unique limit point of the replicator dynamics.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 08-049/1.
Date of creation: 16 May 2008
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Auctions; Sealed-Bid Auction; Evolutionary Stability; Endogenous Entry; Maximin;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
- L83 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Sports; Gambling; Restaurants; Recreation; Tourism
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-05-31 (All new papers)
- NEP-EXP-2008-05-31 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2008-05-31 (Game Theory)
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