This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Auctions under Payoff Uncertainty: The Case with Heterogeneous Bidder-Aversion to Downside Risk

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Audrey Hu () (University of Amsterdam)
Liang Zou (University of Amsterdam)
Abstract

This paper characterizes the optimal first-price auction (FPA) and second-price auction (SPA) for selling rights, contracts, or licenses that involve ensuing payoff uncertainty for the winning bidder. The distribution of the random payoff is common knowledge, except that bidders have private degrees of aversion to downside-risk. In this model, the optimal FPA entails a lower reserve price, a higher expected revenue, and higher expected utilities for at least some or all bidders than the optimal SPA does, which suggests that FPA dominates SPA in terms of both allocative and Pareto efficiency. Increasing risk or risk aversion generally leads to lower equilibrium bids.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.tinbergen.nl/discussionpapers/08044.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 08-044/1.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 21 Apr 2008
Date of revision: 22 Apr 2008
Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20080044

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.tinbergen.nl/

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Walther Schoonenberg).

Related research
Keywords: auction; downside risk; risk aversion; payoff uncertainty; allocative efficiency; Pareto efficiency;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Jonathan Shalev, 2000. "Loss aversion equilibrium," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 269-287. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Bawa, Vijay S., 1975. "Optimal rules for ordering uncertain prospects," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 95-121, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Vincent P. Crawford & Nagore Iriberri, 2007. "Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(6), pages 1721-1770, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Bawa, Vijay S, 1976. "Admissible Portfolios for All Individuals," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 31(4), pages 1169-83, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Moore, John, 1984. "Global Incentive Constraints in Auction Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1523-35, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Benartzi, Shlomo & Thaler, Richard H, 1995. "Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity Premium Puzzle," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 110(1), pages 73-92, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Goeree, Jacob K. & Offerman, Theo, 2003. "Winner's curse without overbidding," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(4), pages 625-644, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Cox, James C & Smith, Vernon L & Walker, James M, 1988. " Theory and Individual Behavior of First-Price Auctions," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 61-99, March.
  9. K. Goeree & Theo Offerman, 2002. "Efficiency in Auctions with Private and Common Values: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(3), pages 625-643, June. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Cox, James C. & Smith, Vernon L. & Walker, James M., 1982. "Auction market theory of heterogeneous bidders," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 319-325. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Bawa, Vijay S. & Lindenberg, Eric B., 1977. "Capital market equilibrium in a mean-lower partial moment framework," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 189-200, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? No RePEc service, like IDEAS, charges for the use or the display of bibliographic data.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-10.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.