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Simultaneous Pooled Auctions with Multiple Bids and Preference Lists

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Author Info
Maarten C.W. Janssen () (Erasmus University Rotterdam)
Vladimir A. Karamychev () (Erasmus University Rotterdam)
Emiel Maasland () (Erasmus University Rotterdam)

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Abstract

A simultaneous pooled auction with multiple bids and preference lists is a way to auction multiple objects, in which bidders simultaneously express a bid for each object and a preference ordering over which object they would like to get in case they have the highest bid on more than one object. This type of auction has been used in the Netherlands and in Ireland to auction available spectrum. We show that this type of auction does not satisfy elementary desirable properties such as the existence of an efficient equilibrium.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 08-034/1.

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Date of creation: 28 Mar 2008
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20080034

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Web page: http://www.tinbergen.nl/

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Related research
Keywords: Simultaneous pooled auctions Multi-object sealed-bid auctions Multiple bids Single-object demand Preference lists

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Jacob K. Goeree & Charles R. Plott & John Wooders, 2004. "Bidders' Choice Auctions: Raising Revenues Through the Right to Choose," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(2-3), pages 504-515, 04/05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Moldovanu, Benny & Sela, Aner, 2003. "Patent licensing to Bertrand competitors," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 1-13, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Roberto Burguet, 2005. "The condominium problem; auctions for substitutes," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 73-90, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2008-7-23.

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