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The Reverse Talmud Rule for Bankruptcy Problems

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Author Info
Rene van den Brink () (VU University Amsterdam)
Yukihiko Funaki () (Waseda University Tokyo)
Gerard van der Laan () (VU University Amsterdam)
Abstract

We introduce a new solution for bankruptcy problems that satisfies weaker versions of the Exemption en Exclusion properties from the literature. Although the principles of Exclusion and Exemption are appealing, the specific conditions under which an agent receives its claim, respectively nothing, seem arbitrary and are inconsistent in the sense that there is no bankruptcy rule that satisfies both. However, weakening these conditions (by putting lower boundaries on what is considered to be a ‘small claim’), there do exist rules satisfying both principles. In this paper we consider a Weak Exemption and a Weak Exclusion property such that there is a unique bankruptcy rule that satisfies these two properties together with Consistency and Weak Proportionality (i.e. a change in the estate effects the payoffs of agents with bigger claims more than the payoffs of agents with smaller claims). This rule turns out to be some kind of reverse of the famous Talmud rule. Moreover, we show that Weak Exemption and Weak Exclusion are each others dual, and that the Reverse Talmud rule also can be characterized as the unique Self-Dual solution that satisfies Weak Proportionality and either Weak Exemption or Weak Exclusion. Finally, we generalize the Reverse Talmud rule to a class of bankruptcy rules that all satisfy some Weak Exemption and some Weak Exclusion property (that are not necessarily each others dual), which contains the famous Constrained Equal Awards and Constrained Equal Losses rules as extreme cases.

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Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 08-026/1.

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Date of creation: 07 Mar 2008
Date of revision: 27 Mar 2008
Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20080026

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Related research
Keywords: Bankruptcy problem Exemption Exclusion Self-Duality Talmud rule Reverse Talmud Rule

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Hervé Moulin, 2000. "Priority Rules and Other Asymmetric Rationing Methods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(3), pages 643-684, May.
  2. Chun, Youngsub, 1988. "The proportional solution for rights problems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 231-246, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Aumann, Robert J. & Maschler, Michael, 1985. "Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 195-213, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Youngsub Chun, 1999. "Equivalence of axioms for bankruptcy problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 28(4), pages 511-520. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Youngsub Chun, 1999. "Equivalence of Axioms for Bankruptcy Problems," Working Paper Series no1, Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University.
  6. Nir Dagan, 1996. "New Characterizations of Old Bankruptcy Rules," Economic theory and game theory 002, Nir Dagan. [Downloadable!]
  7. Herrero, Carmen & Maschler, Michael & Villar, Antonio, 1999. "Individual rights and collective responsibility: the rights-egalitarian solution," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 59-77, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Nir Dagan & Oscar Volij, 1993. "The Bankruptcy Problem: a Cooperative Bargaining Approach," Economic theory and game theory 001, Nir Dagan. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Juan Moreno-Ternero & Antonio Villar, 2006. "The TAL-Family of Rules for Bankruptcy Problems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 231-249, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Young, H. P., 1988. "Distributive justice in taxation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 321-335, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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