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Selecting less Corruptible Bureaucrats

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  • Audrey Hu

    ()
    (Universiteit van Amsterdam)

  • Liang Zhou

    ()
    (Universiteit van Amsterdam)

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    Abstract

    A government officials' propensity to corruption, or corruptibility, can be affected by his intertemporal preference over job benefits. Through a dynamic model of rent-seeking behavior, this paper examines how endogenously determined corruptibility changes with monitoring intensity, salary growth, and discount factor for expected future income. The paper illustrates credible circumstances in which the less an official values his job the more he seeks rents. This negative relation suggests a simple quasi-auction mechanism for selecting less corruptible public servants. While straightforward to implement, the quasi-auction also tends to circumvent the corrupt influence that is often associated with standard auction of jobs.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 07-096/1.

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    Date of creation: 11 Dec 2007
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    Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20070096

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    Web page: http://www.tinbergen.nl

    Related research

    Keywords: rent seeking; corruption; selection of officials; quasi-auction; sale of jobs;

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