The Impact of Naïve Advice and Observational Learning in Beauty-contest Games
AbstractWe study the impact of advice or observation on the depth of reasoning in an experimental beauty-contest game. Both sources of information trigger faster convergence to the equilibrium. Yet, we find that subjects who receive naïve advice outperform uninformed subjects permanently, whereas subjects who observe others’ past behavior before making their decision do only have a temporary advantage over uninformed subjects. We show in a simulation that the latter result is due to subjects failing to make the most out of observing others.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 07-015/1.
Date of creation: 29 Jan 2007
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social learning; advice; observational learning; beauty-contest game;
Other versions of this item:
- Martin G. Kocher & Matthias Sutter & Florian Wakolbinger, 2007. "The impact of naive advice and observational learning in beauty-contest games," Working Papers 2007-01, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-03-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2007-03-03 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2007-03-03 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2007-03-03 (Game Theory)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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