Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Does Stake Size matter for Cooperation and Punishment?

Contents:

Author Info

  • Martin G. Kocher

    ()
    (CREED, Universiteit van Amsterdam)

  • Peter Martinsson

    ()
    (G�teborg University, Sweden)

  • Martine Visser

    ()
    (G�teborg University, Sweden)

Abstract

The effects of stake size on cooperation and punishment are investigated using a public goods experiment. We find that an increase in stake size does neither significantly affect cooperation nor, interestingly, the level of punishment.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://papers.tinbergen.nl/06104.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 06-104/1.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 22 Nov 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20060104

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.tinbergen.nl

Related research

Keywords: experiment; public goods; punishment; stake size;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Carpenter, Jeffrey & Verhoogen, Eric & Burks, Stephen, 2005. "The effect of stakes in distribution experiments," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 86(3), pages 393-398, March.
  2. Anderson, Christopher M. & Putterman, Louis, 2006. "Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law of demand? The demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 1-24, January.
  3. Smith, Vernon L & Walker, James M, 1993. "Rewards, Experience and Decision Costs in First Price Auctions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, Western Economic Association International, vol. 31(2), pages 237-45, April.
  4. Jeffrey Carpenter, 2002. "The Demand for Punishment," Middlebury College Working Paper Series, Middlebury College, Department of Economics 0243, Middlebury College, Department of Economics.
  5. Johansson-Stenman, Olof & Mahmud, Minhaj & Martinsson, Peter, 2004. "Does stake size matter in trust games?," Working Papers in Economics, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics 140, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
  6. James M. Walker & Matthew A. Halloran, 2004. "Rewards and Sanctions and the Provision of Public Goods in One-Shot Settings," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 235-247, October.
  7. Charles A. Holt & Susan K. Laury, 2002. "Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1644-1655, December.
  8. Simon Gaechter & Benedikt Herrmann, 2006. "The limits of self-governance in the presence of spite: Experimental evidence from urban and rural Russia," Discussion Papers, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham 2006-13, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
  9. Camerer, Colin F. & Hogarth, Robin M., 1999. "The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework," Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences 1059, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  10. Cameron, Lisa A, 1999. "Raising the Stakes in the Ultimatum Game: Experimental Evidence from Indonesia," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, Western Economic Association International, vol. 37(1), pages 47-59, January.
  11. Clark, Kenneth & Sefton, Martin, 2001. "The Sequential Prisoner's Dilemma: Evidence on Reciprocation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(468), pages 51-68, January.
  12. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, . "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," IEW - Working Papers, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich 010, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  13. Robert Slonim & Alvin E. Roth, 1998. "Learning in High Stakes Ultimatum Games: An Experiment in the Slovak Republic," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 569-596, May.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Kocher, Martin G. & Martinsson, Peter & Visser, Martine, 2012. "Social background, cooperative behavior, and norm enforcement," Munich Reprints in Economics, University of Munich, Department of Economics 18163, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  2. Ralph-C. Bayer & Elke Renner & Rupert Sausgruber, 2013. "Confusion and learning in the voluntary contributions game," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 16(4), pages 478-496, December.
  3. Lefèbvre, Mathieu & Vieider, Ferdinand M. & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2009. "Incentive Effects on Risk Attitude in Small Probability Prospects," IZA Discussion Papers 4545, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  4. Robert Oxoby, 2013. "Paretian dictators: constraining choice in a voluntary contribution game," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 125-138, June.
  5. Hasson, Reviva & Löfgren, Åsa & Visser, Martine, 2010. "Climate change in a public goods game: Investment decision in mitigation versus adaptation," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 331-338, December.
  6. Daniel Arce & Sneha Bakshi & Rachel Croson & Catherine Eckel & Enrique Fatas & Malcolm Kass, 2011. "Counterterrorism strategies in the lab," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 149(3), pages 465-478, December.
  7. Kyung Hwan Baik & Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Abhijit Ramalingam, 2014. "Resources for Conflict: Constraint or Wealth?," University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK. 061, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
  8. Martinsson, Peter & Villegas-Palacio, Clara & Wollbrant, Conny, 2009. "Conditional Cooperation and Social Group: Experimental Results from Colombia," Discussion Papers, Resources For the Future dp-09-16-efd, Resources For the Future.
  9. Eckel, Catherine & Gintis, Herbert, 2010. "Blaming the messenger: Notes on the current state of experimental economics," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 109-119, January.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20060104. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Antoine Maartens (+31 626 - 160 892)).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.