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Group Polarization in the Team Dictator Game reconsidered

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  • Wolfgang J. Luhan

    ()
    (University of Innsbruck)

  • Martin G. Kocher

    ()
    (Universiteit van Amsterdam)

  • Matthias Sutter

    ()
    (University of Cologne)

Abstract

While most papers_new on team decision-making find teams to behave more selfish, less trusting and less altruistic than individuals, Cason and Mui (1997) report that teams are more altruistic than individuals in a dictator game. Using a within-subjects design we re-examine group polarization by letting subjects make individual as well as team decisions in an experimental dictator game. In our experiment teams are more selfish than individuals, and the most selfish team member has the strongest influence on team decisions. Various sources of the different findings in Cason and Mui (1997) and in our paper are discussed.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 06-099/1.

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Date of creation: 01 Nov 2006
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20060099

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Web page: http://www.tinbergen.nl

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Keywords: experiment; dictator game; team behavior; social preferences;

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