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Computing Alternating Offers and Water Prices in Bilateral River Basin Management

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Author Info
Harold Houba () (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)

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Abstract

This contribution deals with the fundamental critique in Dinar et al. (1992, Theory and Decision 32) on the use of Game theory in water management: People are reluctant to monetary transfers unrelated to water prices and game theoretic solutions impose a computational burden. For the bilateral alternating-offers model, a single optimization program significantly reduces the computational burden. Furthermore, water prices and property rights result from exploiting the Second Welfare Theorem. Both issues are discussed and applied to a bilateral version of the theoretical river basin model in Ambec and Sprumont (2002). Directions for future research are provided.

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Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 06-095/1.

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Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20060095

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Related research
Keywords: International River Management; Negotiation Theory; Game Theory; Computations; Non-transferable utility; Property rights; Walrasian equilibrium prices; Applied General Equilibrium model;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General
D58 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Computable and Other Applied General Equilibrium Models

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Houba, Harold & Wen, Quan, 2006. "Different time preferences and non-stationary contracts in negotiations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 273-279, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Busch, Lutz-Alexander & Wen, Quan, 1995. "Perfect Equilibria in Negotiation Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(3), pages 545-65, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Carlo Carraro & Carmen Marchiori & Alessandra Sgobbi, 2006. "Advances in Negotiation Theory: Bargaining, Coalitions and Fairness," Working Papers 2006_08, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari", Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Crawford, Vincent P, 1982. "A Theory of Disagreement in Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(3), pages 607-37, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Harold Houba, . "Alternating Offers in Economic Environments," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 05-064/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Carlo Carraro & Carmen Marchiori & Alessandra Sgobbi, 2005. "Applications of Negotiation Theory to Water Issues," Working Papers 2005.65, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Muthoo, Abhinay, 1992. "Revocable Commitment and Sequential Bargaining," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 102(411), pages 378-87, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Harold Houba & Wilko Bolt, 1997. "Strategic bargaining in the variable threat game," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 57-77. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Ken Binmore & Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1986. "The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(2), pages 176-188, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Roemer, John E., 1988. "Axiomatic bargaining theory on economic environments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 1-31, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Herrero, Maria Jose, 1989. "The nash program: Non-convex bargaining problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 266-277, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Haller, Hans & Holden, Steinar, 1990. "A letter to the editor on wage bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 232-236, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Houba, Harold, 1997. "The policy bargaining model," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 1-27, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Sophie Thoyer & Sylvie Morardet & Patrick Rio & Leo Simon & Rachel Goodhue & Gordon Rausser, 2001. "A Bargaining Model to Simulate Negotiations Between Water Users," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 4. [Downloadable!]
  17. Harold Houba, . "Stochastic Orders of Proposing Players in Bargaining," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 05-063/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  18. Fernandez, Raquel & Glazer, Jacob, 1991. "Striking for a Bargain between Two Completely Informed Agents," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 240-52, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  19. Ambec, S. & Sprumont, Y., 2000. "Sharing a River," Papers 00-06, Laval - Recherche en Energie.
    Other versions:
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Erik Ansink, 2009. "Self-enforcing Agreements on Water allocation," Working Papers 2009.73, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
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