On the Importance of Default Breach Remedies

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On the Importance of Default Breach Remedies

Author Info

Randolph Sloof () (Universiteit van Amsterdam)
Hessel Oosterbeek () (Universiteit van Amsterdam)
Joep Sonnemans () (Universiteit van Amsterdam)

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Abstract

This discussion paper has resulted in a publication in the Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 163(1) 5-22.

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Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 06-082/1.

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Date of creation: 28 Sep 2006
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20060082

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Article
- Randolph Sloof & Hessel Oosterbeek & Joep Sonnemans, 2007. "On the Importance of Default Breach Remedies," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 163(1), pages 5-22, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Find related papers by JEL classification:
K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2006-11-18 (All new papers)
NEP-EXP-2006-11-18 (Experimental Economics)
NEP-LAW-2006-11-18 (Law & Economics)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Fehr, Ernst & Kremhelmer, Susanne & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2005. "Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights," CEPR Discussion Papers 5369, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Ernst Fehr & Susanne Kremhelmer & Klaus M. Schmidt, . "Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights," IEW - Working Papers iewwp224, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
- Ernst Fehr & Susanne Kremhelmer & Klaus M. Schmidt, 2004. "Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights," Discussion Papers 11, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
- Ernst Fehr & Susanne Kremhelmer & Klaus Schmidt, 2005. "Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
- Fehr, Ernst & Kremhelmer, Susanne & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2005. "Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights," Discussion Papers in Economics 727, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Sloof, Randolph, et al, 2003. " An Experimental Comparison of Reliance Levels under Alternative Breach Remedies," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(2), pages 205-22, Summer.
Schwab, Stewart, 1988. "A Coasean Experiment on Contract Presumptions," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(2), pages 237-68, June.
Shavell, Steven, 1984. "The Design of Contracts and Remedies for Breach," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 99(1), pages 121-48, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
William P. Rogerson, 1984. "Efficient Reliance and Damage Measures for Breach of Contract," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(1), pages 39-53, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Charles A. Holt & Susan K. Laury, 2002. "Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1644-1655, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Sloof, Randolph & Oosterbeek, Hessel & Riedl, Arno & Sonnemans, Joep, 2006. "Breach remedies, reliance and renegotiation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 263-296, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Steven Shavell, 1980. "Damage Measures for Breach of Contract," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(2), pages 466-490, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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