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Cooperation in the Classroom: Experimenting with R&D Cooperatives Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Michelle Sovinsky Goeree () (Claremont McKenna College)
Jeroen Hinloopen () (Universiteit van Amsterdam)
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This paper describes a classroom experiment that illustrates the research and development investment incentives facing firms when technological spillovers are present. The game involves two stages in which student sellers first make investment decisions then production decisions. The classroom game can be used to motivate discussions of research joint ventures, the free-rider problem, collusion, and antitrust policy regarding research and development.
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Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number
06-081/1.
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Date of creation: 27 Sep 2006Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20060081Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.tinbergen.nl/
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Walther Schoonenberg).
Keywords: classroom games ; research and development ; research joint ventures ; technological spillovers ; Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
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