Limiting Limited Liability
AbstractLimited liability may result in inefficient accident prevention, because a relevant portion of the expected harm is externalized on victims. This paper shows that under some restrictive conditions further limiting liability by means of a liability cap can improve caretaking.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 06-070/1.
Date of creation: 09 Aug 2006
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insolvency; judgment proof; liability; bankruptcy; liability cap;
Other versions of this item:
- K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
- K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
- L59 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Other
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- G. Dari Mattiacci & G.G.A. de Geest, 2004.
"When Will Judgment Proof Injurers Take Too Much Precaution?,"
04-27, Utrecht School of Economics.
- Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe & De Geest, Gerrit, 2006. "When will judgment proof injurers take too much precaution?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 336-354, September.
- Giuseppe Dari Mattiacci & Gerrit De Geest, . "When Will Judgment Proof Injurers Take Too Much Precaution?," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2002-1-1051, Berkeley Electronic Press.
- T. Randolph Beard, 1990. "Bankruptcy and Care Choice," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(4), pages 626-634, Winter.
- Boyd, James & Ingberman, Daniel E., 1999. "Do punitive damages promote deterrence?1," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 47-68, March.
- Craswell, Richard & Calfee, John E, 1986. "Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 279-303, Fall.
- Mattiacci, Giuseppe Dari & Parisi, Francesco, 2003. "The cost of delegated control: vicarious liability, secondary liability and mandatory insurance," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 453-475, December.
- Gérard Mondello, 2012.
"Strict Liability, Capped Strict Liability, and Care Effort under Asymmetric Information,"
- Gérard Mondello, 2012. "Strict Liability, Capped Strict Liability, and Care Effort under Asymmetric Information," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 168(2), pages 232-251, June.
- Gérard Mondello, 2010. "Risky Activities and Strict Liability Rules: Delegating Safety," Working Papers 2010.103, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
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