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A Collective Household Model of Time Allocation - A Comparison of Native Dutch and Immigrant Households in The Netherlands

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Author Info

  • Chris van Klaveren

    ()
    (University of Amsterdam)

  • Bernard M.S. van Praag

    ()
    (University of Amsterdam)

  • Henriette Maassen van den Brink

    ()
    (University of Amsterdam)

Abstract

Although the number of immigrant households in the Netherlands is substantial, the labor supply choices of this group are usually neglected in empirical studies because these households are usually under-sampled. We use a stratified sample of Turkish, Surinamese/Antillean and Dutch households that enables us to discuss how two-earner households allocate their time to different activities. In order to do so, we empirically estimate a collective household labor supply model. The main findings are that: (1) Leisure and household income are the most important variables in the utility function of the male; (2) Leisure, total household production and total household production interacted with family size are important variables in the utility function of the female. The latter two are especially important for Turkish and Surinamese/Antillean females; (3) The utility of Turkish and Dutch males weighs slightly more than the utility of the partner in the household utility f! unction. For Surinamese/Antillean families we find the opposite; (4) Utility weighting depends on the presence of children and on the hourly wage rates of both partners; (5) The labor supply curve is forward bending for both male and female in terms of their own wage. The labor supply curve is backward bending for both male and female in terms of the partners wage. We find this for all household types; (7) The presence of(more) children reduces the hours of labor supplied by women and increases the number of hours supplied by men.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 06-052/3.

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Date of creation: 21 Jun 2006
Date of revision: 22 Jun 2006
Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20060052

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Web page: http://www.tinbergen.nl

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Keywords: Collective household models; Labor supply; Intra-household; time allocation;

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  1. Lundberg, Shelly & Pollak, Robert A, 1994. "Noncooperative Bargaining Models of Marriage," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(2), pages 132-37, May.
  2. Martin Browning & P.A. Chiappori, 1996. "Efficient Intra-Household Allocations - A General Characterization and Empirical Tests," Discussion Papers 96-10, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  3. Browning, Martin, 1992. "Children and Household Economic Behavior," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 30(3), pages 1434-75, September.
  4. Killingsworth, Mark R. & Heckman, James J., 1987. "Female labor supply: A survey," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & R. Layard (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 2, pages 103-204 Elsevier.
  5. Apps, Patricia F & Rees, Ray, 1997. "Collective Labor Supply and Household Production," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 178-90, February.
  6. Lundberg, S. & Pollak, R.A., 1991. "Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market," Working Papers 91-08, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
  7. Martin Browning & Pierre-André Chiappori & Valérie Lechene, 2004. "Collective and Unitary Models: a Clarification," CAM Working Papers 2004-15, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Applied Microeconometrics.
  8. Rees, Ray, 1988. "Taxation and the Household," Munich Reprints in Economics 3411, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  9. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, 1997. "Introducing Household Production in Collective Models of Labor Supply," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 191-209, February.
  10. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, 1988. "Rational Household Labor Supply," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(1), pages 63-90, January.
  11. McElroy, Marjorie B & Horney, Mary Jean, 1981. "Nash-Bargained Household Decisions: Toward a Generalization of the Theory of Demand," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 22(2), pages 333-49, June.
  12. Apps, Patricia F. & Rees, Ray, 1988. "Taxation and the household," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 355-369, April.
  13. Pencavel, John, 1987. "Labor supply of men: A survey," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & R. Layard (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 1, pages 3-102 Elsevier.
  14. Manser, Marilyn & Brown, Murray, 1980. "Marriage and Household Decision-Making: A Bargaining Analysis," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 21(1), pages 31-44, February.
  15. Fortin, Bernard & Lacroix, Guy, 1997. "A Test of the Unitary and Collective Models of Household Labour Supply," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(443), pages 933-55, July.
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Cited by:
  1. Heijdra, B.J. & Ligthart, J.E., 2005. "Fiscal Policy, Monopolistic Competition and Finite Lives," Discussion Paper 2005-126, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  2. Ribar, David C., 2012. "Immigrants' Time Use: A Survey of Methods and Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 6931, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).

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