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A Collective Household Model of Time Allocation - A Comparison of Native Dutch and Immigrant Households in The Netherlands

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Author Info
Chris van Klaveren () (Universiteit van Amsterdam)
Bernard M.S. van Praag () (Universiteit van Amsterdam)
Henriette Maassen van den Brink () (Universiteit van Amsterdam)

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Abstract

Although the number of immigrant households in the Netherlands is substantial, the labor supply choices of this group are usually neglected in empirical studies because these households are usually under-sampled. We use a stratified sample of Turkish, Surinamese/Antillean and Dutch households that enables us to discuss how two-earner households allocate their time to different activities. In order to do so, we empirically estimate a collective household labor supply model. The main findings are that: (1) Leisure and household income are the most important variables in the utility function of the male; (2) Leisure, total household production and total household production interacted with family size are important variables in the utility function of the female. The latter two are especially important for Turkish and Surinamese/Antillean females; (3) The utility of Turkish and Dutch males weighs slightly more than the utility of the partner in the household utility f! unction. For Surinamese/Antillean families we find the opposite; (4) Utility weighting depends on the presence of children and on the hourly wage rates of both partners; (5) The labor supply curve is forward bending for both male and female in terms of their own wage. The labor supply curve is backward bending for both male and female in terms of the partners wage. We find this for all household types; (7) The presence of (more) children reduces the hours of labor supplied by women and increases the number of hours supplied by men.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 06-052/3.

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Date of creation: 21 Jun 2006
Date of revision: 22 Jun 2006
Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20060052

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Web page: http://www.tinbergen.nl/

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Related research
Keywords: Collective household models Labor supply Intra-household time allocation

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D12 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Apps, Patricia F. & Rees, Ray, 1988. "Taxation and the household," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 355-369, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, 1997. "Introducing Household Production in Collective Models of Labor Supply," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 191-209, February.
    Other versions:
  3. Lundberg, Shelly & Pollak, Robert A, 1993. "Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(6), pages 988-1010, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Valerie Lechene & Martin Browning & Pierre-Andre Chiappori, 2004. "Collective and unitary models: a clarification," Economics Series Working Papers 191, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Killingsworth, Mark R. & Heckman, James J., 1987. "Female labor supply: A survey," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & R. Layard (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 2, pages 103-204 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. M. Browning & P. A. Chiappori, 1998. "Efficient Intra-Household Allocations: A General Characterization and Empirical Tests," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(6), pages 1241-1278, November.
    Other versions:
  7. Manser, Marilyn & Brown, Murray, 1980. "Marriage and Household Decision-Making: A Bargaining Analysis," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 21(1), pages 31-44, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. McElroy, Marjorie B & Horney, Mary Jean, 1981. "Nash-Bargained Household Decisions: Toward a Generalization of the Theory of Demand," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 22(2), pages 333-49, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Fortin, Bernard & Lacroix, Guy, 1997. "A Test of the Unitary and Collective Models of Household Labour Supply," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(443), pages 933-55, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Lundberg, Shelly & Pollak, Robert A, 1994. "Noncooperative Bargaining Models of Marriage," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(2), pages 132-37, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Apps, Patricia F & Rees, Ray, 1997. "Collective Labor Supply and Household Production," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 178-90, February.
    Other versions:
  12. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, 1988. "Rational Household Labor Supply," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(1), pages 63-90, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Browning, Martin, 1992. "Children and Household Economic Behavior," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 30(3), pages 1434-75, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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