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Transparency and Pre-meetings

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Author Info

  • Job Swank

    (Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam)

  • Otto Swank

    ()
    (Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, and DNB)

  • Bauke Visser

    ()
    (Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam)

Abstract

Some committees are made up of experts, persons interested in both the (subject) matter at hand and in coming across as able decision-makers. Such committees would like to conceal disagreement from the public. We present a theory that describes the reaction of experts to the requirement to publish verbatim transcripts of their meetings: the emergence of an informal ‘premeeting’; the move of the real debate from the formal meeting to the premeeting; and the drop in disagreement in the formal meeting. We analyse what the effect is on accountability and quality of decision-making. Finally, we present evidence suggesting that our model describes the way members of the Federal Open Market Committee in the United States responded to the publication of verbatim transcripts of their meetings.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 06-051/1.

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Date of creation: 07 Jun 2006
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20060051

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Web page: http://www.tinbergen.nl

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Keywords: Committees; pre-meetings; reputational concerns; transparency;

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References

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  1. EllenE. Meade & David Stasavage, 2008. "Publicity of Debate and the Incentive to Dissent: Evidence from the US Federal Reserve," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(528), pages 695-717, 04.
  2. Kiel, Alexandra & Gerling, Kerstin & Schulte, Elisabeth & Grüner, Hans Peter, 2003. "Information acquisition and decision making in committees: a survey," Working Paper Series, European Central Bank 0256, European Central Bank.
  3. Henry W. Chappell, Jr. & Rob Roy McGregor & Todd A. Vermilyea, 2005. "Committee Decisions on Monetary Policy: Evidence from Historical Records of the Federal Open Market Committee," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262033305, December.
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  6. Hao Li & Sherwin Rosen & Wing Suen, 2001. "Conflicts and Common Interests in Committees," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1478-1497, December.
  7. Meirowitz, Adam, 2005. "Deliberative Democracy or Market Democracy: Designing Institutions to Aggregate Preferences and Information," Papers, Princeton University, Research Program in Political Economy 03-28-2005, Princeton University, Research Program in Political Economy.
  8. Joseph Stiglitz, 1998. "Distinguished Lecture on Economics in Government: The Private Uses of Public Interests: Incentives and Institutions," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 12(2), pages 3-22, Spring.
  9. Bengt Holmstrom, 1999. "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective," NBER Working Papers 6875, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Sharon Kozicki, 1999. "How useful are Taylor rules for monetary policy?," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, issue Q II, pages 5-33.
  11. Nicola Persico, 2004. "Committee Design with Endogenous Information," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(1), pages 165-191.
  12. Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1996. "Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1170, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  13. Ellen E. Meade & David Stasavage, 2004. "Publicity of debate and the incentive to dissent: evidence from the US federal reserve," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library 19994, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  14. Ottaviani, Marco & Sorensen, Peter, 2001. "Information aggregation in debate: who should speak first?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 81(3), pages 393-421, September.
  15. Nicola Persico, 2004. "Committee Design with Endogenous Information," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71(1), pages 165-191, 01.
  16. Alan Blinder, 2006. "Monetary Policy by Committee: Why and How?," DNB Working Papers, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department 092, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Christopher W. Crowe & Ellen E. Meade, 2008. "Central Bank Independence and Transparency," IMF Working Papers 08/119, International Monetary Fund.
  2. Christopher Crowe & Ellen E. Meade, 2007. "The Evolution of Central Bank Governance around the World," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 21(4), pages 69-90, Fall.
  3. Hans Gersbach & Volker Hahn, 2012. "Information acquisition and transparency in committees," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 41(2), pages 427-453, May.
  4. Hahn, Volker, 2008. "Committees, sequential voting and transparency," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 366-385, November.
  5. Dessein, Wouter, 2007. "Why a Group Needs a Leader: Decision-making and Debate in Committees," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 6168, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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