Transparency and Pre-meetings

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Transparency and Pre-meetings

Author Info

Job Swank (Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam)
Otto Swank () (Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, and DNB)
Bauke Visser () (Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam)

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Abstract

Some committees are made up of experts, persons interested in both the (subject) matter at hand and in coming across as able decision-makers. Such committees would like to conceal disagreement from the public. We present a theory that describes the reaction of experts to the requirement to publish verbatim transcripts of their meetings: the emergence of an informal ‘premeeting’; the move of the real debate from the formal meeting to the premeeting; and the drop in disagreement in the formal meeting. We analyse what the effect is on accountability and quality of decision-making. Finally, we present evidence suggesting that our model describes the way members of the Federal Open Market Committee in the United States responded to the publication of verbatim transcripts of their meetings.

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Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 06-051/1.

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Date of creation: 07 Jun 2006
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20060051

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2006-07-02 (All new papers)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

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Other versions:
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Other versions:
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Other versions:
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Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Eijffinger, Sylvester C W & van der Cruijsen, Carin A B, 2007. "The Economic Impact of Central Bank Transparency: A Survey," CEPR Discussion Papers 6070, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Cruijsen, C. van der & Eijffinger, S.C.W., 2007. "The Economic Impact of Central Bank Transparency: A Survey," Discussion Paper 2007-06, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
- Carin van der Cruijsen & Sylvester Eijffinger, 2007. "The economic impact of central bank transparency: a survey," DNB Working Papers 132, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
Dessein, Wouter, 2007. "Why a Group Needs a Leader: Decision-making and Debate in Committees," CEPR Discussion Papers 6168, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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