Learning in a Local Interaction Hawk-Dove Game
AbstractWe study how players in a local interaction hawk dove game will learn, if they can either imitate the most succesful player in the neighborhood or play a best reply versus the opponent's previous action. From simulations it appears that each learning strategy will be used, because each performs better when it is less popular. Despite that, clustering may occur if players choose their learning strategy on the basis of largely similar information. Finally, on average players will play Hawk with a probability larger than in the mixed Nash equilibrium of the stage game.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 06-034/1.
Date of creation: 29 Mar 2006
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.tinbergen.nl
Learning; Local Interaction; Hawk-Dove game;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-04-29 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2006-04-29 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2006-04-29 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2006-04-29 (Game Theory)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Maarten C.W. Janssen, 2000. "Imitation of Cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma Games with Some Local Interaction," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 00-019/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- Oliver Kirchkamp, 1994.
"Spatial Evolution of Automata in the Prisoners' Dilemma,"
Game Theory and Information
9403003, EconWPA, revised 18 May 1994.
- Kirchkamp, Oliver, 2000. "Spatial evolution of automata in the prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 239-262, October.
- Kirchkamp, Oliver, 1995. "Spatial Evolution of Automata in the Prisoners' Dilemma," Discussion Paper Serie B 330, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Kirchkamp, Oliver, 1996.
"Simultaneous Evolution of Learning Rules and Strategies,"
Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications
98-46, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
- Kirchkamp, Oliver, 1999. "Simultaneous evolution of learning rules and strategies," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 295-312, November.
- Kirchkamp, Oliver, 1996. "Simultaneous Evolution of Learning Rules and Strategies," Discussion Paper Serie B 379, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Joëlle Noailly & Cees Withagen & Jeroen Bergh, 2007.
"Spatial Evolution of Social Norms in a Common-Pool Resource Game,"
Environmental & Resource Economics,
European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 36(1), pages 113-141, January.
- Noailly, J. & Withagen, C.A.A.M. & Bergh, J.C.J.M. van den, 2007. "Spatial evolution of social norms in a common-pool resource game," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-192946, Tilburg University.
- Joëlle Noailly & Cees A. Withagen & Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh, 2005. "Spatial Evolution of Social Norms in a Common-Pool Resource Game," Working Papers 2005.79, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Josephson, Jens, 2008.
"A numerical analysis of the evolutionary stability of learning rules,"
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,
Elsevier, vol. 32(5), pages 1569-1599, May.
- Josephson, Jens, 2001. "A Numerical Analysis of the Evolutionary Stability of Learning Rules," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 474, Stockholm School of Economics.
- Possajennikov, A., 2000. "Learning and Evolution in Games and Oligopoly Models," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-82134, Tilburg University.
- Ellison, Glenn, 1993.
"Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination,"
Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1047-71, September.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1998.
"Learning in Games,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
2222, David K. Levine.
- Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993.
"Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games,"
Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January.
- M. Kandori & G. Mailath & R. Rob, 1999. "Learning, Mutation and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 500, David K. Levine.
- Kandori, M. & Mailath, G.J., 1991. "Learning, Mutation, And Long Run Equilibria In Games," Papers 71, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - John M. Olin Program.
- Aderlini, L. & Ianni, A., 1993.
"Path Dependence and Learning from Neighbours,"
186, Cambridge - Risk, Information & Quantity Signals.
- Eshel, I. & Samuelson, L. & Shaked, A., 1996.
"Altruists, Egoists and Hooligans in a Local Interaction Model,"
9612r, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Droste, Edward & Hommes, Cars & Tuinstra, Jan, 2002.
"Endogenous fluctuations under evolutionary pressure in Cournot competition,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 232-269, August.
- Droste, E. & Hommes, C.H. & Tuinstra, J., 1999. "Endogenous Fluctuations under Evolutionary Pressure in Cournot Competition," CeNDEF Working Papers 99-04, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance.
- Goyal, Sanjeev & Janssen, Maarten C. W., 1997. "Non-Exclusive Conventions and Social Coordination," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 34-57, November.
- Eshel, Ilan & Samuelson, Larry & Shaked, Avner, 1998. "Altruists, Egoists, and Hooligans in a Local Interaction Model," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 157-79, March.
- Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997. "Evolutionary Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215, June.
- Alexander Tieman & Harold Houba & Gerard Laan, 2000. "On the level of cooperative behavior in a local-interaction model," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 71(1), pages 1-30, February.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Antoine Maartens (+31 626 - 160 892)).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.