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Simultaneous Search with Heterogeneous Firms and Ex Post Competition

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  • Pieter A. Gautier

    ()
    (Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)

  • Ronald P. Wolthoff

    ()
    (Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)

Abstract

In this paper we study the allocation of workers over high and low productivity firms in a labor market with coordination frictions. Specifically, we consider a search model where workers can apply to high and or low productivity firms. Firms that compete for the same candidate can increase their wage offers as often as they like. We show that if workers apply to two jobs, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium where workers mix between sending both applications to the high and sending both to the low productivity sector. But, efficiency requires that they apply to both sectors because a higher matching rate in the high-productivity sector can then be realized with fewer applications (and consequently fewer coordination frictions) if workers always accept the offer of the most productive firm. However, in the market the worker's payoff is determined by how much the firm with the second highest productivity is willing to bid. This is what prevents them from applying to both sectors. For many configurations, the equilibrium outcomes are the same under directed and random search so our results are not driven by random search. We discuss the effects of increasing the number of applications and show that our results can easily be generalized to N -firms. See publication in Labour Economics , 2009, 16(3), 311-19.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 06-032/3.

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Date of creation: 27 Mar 2006
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20060032

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Web page: http://www.tinbergen.nl

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Keywords: Directed search; multiple applications; efficiency;

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  1. Albrecht, James & Gautier, Pieter & Vroman, Susan, 2003. "Equilibrium Directed Search with Multiple Applications," IZA Discussion Papers 719, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  2. Hector Chade & Lones Smith, . "Simultaneous Search," Working Papers, Department of Economics, W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University 2168591, Department of Economics, W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University.
  3. Benoit Julien & John Kennes & Ian King, 2000. "Bidding for Labor," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(4), pages 619-649, October.
  4. Galenianos, Manolis & Kircher, Philipp, 2009. "Directed search with multiple job applications," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 445-471, March.
  5. Peters, Michael, 1991. "Ex Ante Price Offers in Matching Games Non-steady States," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 59(5), pages 1425-54, September.
  6. Robert Shimer, 2001. "The Assignment of Workers to Jobs In an Economy with Coordination Frictions," NBER Working Papers 8501, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Burdett, Kenneth & Judd, Kenneth L, 1983. "Equilibrium Price Dispersion," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 955-69, July.
  8. Diamond, Peter A., 1971. "A model of price adjustment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 156-168, June.
  9. Postel-Vinay & Robin, 2002. "Equilibrium wage dispersion with worker and employer heterogeneity," Working Papers 155908, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, France.
  10. Kultti, Klaus, 1999. "Equivalence of Auctions and Posted Prices," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 106-113, April.
  11. Steven J. Davis, 2001. "The Quality Distribution of Jobs and the Structure of Wages in Search Equilibrium," NBER Working Papers 8434, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Kenneth Burdett & Shouyong Shi & Randall Wright, 2001. "Pricing and Matching with Frictions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(5), pages 1060-1085, October.
  13. Moen, Espen R, 1997. "Competitive Search Equilibrium," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 385-411, April.
  14. Gautier, Pieter & Moraga-González, José L., 2004. "Strategic Wage Setting and Coordination Frictions with Multiple Applications," IZA Discussion Papers 1260, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
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Cited by:
  1. Pieter A. Gautier & Jose Luis Moraga-Gonzalez & Ronald P. Wolthoff, 2007. "Structural Estimation of Search Intensity: Do Non-Employed Workers Search Enough?," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute 07-071/3, Tinbergen Institute.
  2. Gautier, Pieter & Holzner, Christian, 2011. "Simultaneous Search and Network Efficiency," IZA Discussion Papers 5859, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  3. Pieter Gautier & Jose Luis Moraga-Gonzalez & Ronald Wolthoff, 2007. "Structural Estimation of Search Intensity: Do non-employed workers search hard enough?," 2007 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics 695, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  4. Gavrel, Frédéric & Lebon, Isabelle & Rebiere, Therese, 2014. "Formal Education Versus Learning-by-Doing," IZA Discussion Papers 8341, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  5. Kaas, Leo, 2008. "Variable Search Intensity in an Economy with Coordination Unemployment," IZA Discussion Papers 3697, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  6. Wolthoff, Ronald P., 2011. "It's About Time: Implications of the Period Length in an Equilibrium Job Search Model," IZA Discussion Papers 6002, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).

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