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Screening Disability Insurance Applications

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  • Philip de Jong

    ()
    (Wilms & Goudriaan Public Economics BV, and Universiteit van Amsterdam)

  • Maarten Lindeboom

    ()
    (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, IZA, HEB, and Netspar)

  • Bas van der Klaauw

    ()
    (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, SCHOLAR, IFAU, IZA, and CEPR)

Abstract

This discussion paper led to a publication in 'Journal of the European Economic Association' , 9(1), 106-29. This paper investigates the effects of intensified screening of disability insurance benefit applications. A large-scale experiment was setup where in 2 of the 26 Dutch regions case workers of the disability insurance administration were instructed to screen applications more intense. The empirical results show that intense screening reduces long-term sickness absenteeism and disability insurance applications. This provides evidence both for direct effects of the more intensive screening on work resumption during sickness absenteeism and for self-screening by potential disability insurance applicants. We do not find any spillover effects to the inflow into unemployment insurance. A cost-benefit analysis shows that the costs of the intensified screening are only a small fraction of its benefits.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 06-018/3.

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Date of creation: 14 Feb 2006
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20060018

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Web page: http://www.tinbergen.nl

Related research

Keywords: disability insurance; sickness absenteeism; policy evaluation; self-screening; experiment;

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References

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  1. Aslund, Olof & Östh, John & Zenou, Yves, 2006. "How Important is Access to Jobs? Old Question - Improved Answer," CEPR Discussion Papers 5586, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. de Jong, Philip & Lindeboom, Maarten & van der Klaauw, Bas, 2006. "Screening Disability Insurance Applications," CEPR Discussion Papers 5564, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Öster, Anna, 2006. "Parental unemployment and children's school performance," Working Paper Series 2006:5, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
  4. Keisuke Hirano & Guido W. Imbens & Geert Ridder, 2000. "Efficient Estimation of Average Treatment Effects Using the Estimated Propensity Score," NBER Technical Working Papers 0251, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Johansson, Per, 2006. "Using internal replication to establish a treatment effect," Working Paper Series 2006:3, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
  6. Holmlund, Bertil & Liu, Qian & Nordström Skans, Oskar, 2006. "Mind the gap? Estimating the effects of postponing higher education," Working Paper Series 2006:11, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
  7. Parsons, Donald O, 1991. "Self-Screening in Targeted Public Transfer Programs," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(4), pages 859-76, August.
  8. Wang, Iris J Y & Carling, Kenneth & Nääs, Ola, 2006. "High school students' summer jobs and their ensuing labour market achievement," Working Paper Series 2006:14, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
  9. Johansson, Per & Palme, Marten, 1996. "Do economic incentives affect work absence? Empirical evidence using Swedish micro data," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 195-218, February.
  10. Jonathan Gruber, 2000. "Disability Insurance Benefits and Labor Supply," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(6), pages 1162-1183, December.
  11. Bound, John & Burkhauser, Richard V., 1999. "Economic analysis of transfer programs targeted on people with disabilities," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 51, pages 3417-3528 Elsevier.
  12. Janice Halpern & Jerry A. Hausman, 1985. "Choice Under Uncertainty: A Model of Applications for the Social Security Disability Insurance Program," NBER Working Papers 1690, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Philip de Jong & Maarten Lindeboom & Bas van der Klaauw, 2006. "Screening Disability Insurance Applications," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-018/3, Tinbergen Institute.
  14. Johansson, Per & Palme, Mårten, 2001. "Assessing the effect of public policy on worker absenteeism," Working Paper Series 2002:13, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
  15. Forslund, Anders & Nordström Skans, Oskar, 2006. "Swedish youth labour market policies revisited," Working Paper Series 2006:6, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
  16. David H. Autor & Mark G. Duggan, 2003. "The Rise In The Disability Rolls And The Decline In Unemployment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 118(1), pages 157-205, February.
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