This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Competition for a Prize

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Rob van der Noll () (CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, and Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam)
Abstract

I present a model in which individuals compete for a prize by choosing to apply or not. Abilities are private information and in attempt to select the best candidate, the committee compares applicants with an imperfect technology. The choice of application cost, size of the prize and use of information technology are being characterized. In equilibrium, the number of applicants is stochastic and may overload the committee. I show that in spite of overload, the optimal cost (size of the prize) is decreasing (increasing) in market size. Furthermore I show when having a perfect information technology is not optimal.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.tinbergen.nl/discussionpapers/06013.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 06-013/1.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 20 Jan 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20060013

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.tinbergen.nl/

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Walther Schoonenberg).

Related research
Keywords: asymmetric information beauty contest design award competition information overload

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," NBER Working Papers 0401, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Morgan, John, 2003. " Sequential Contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 116(1-2), pages 1-18, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Stefano Ficco, 2004. "Information Overload in Monopsony Markets," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-082/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  4. Hvide, Hans K. & Kristiansen, Eirik G., 2003. "Risk taking in selection contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 172-179, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Taylor, Curtis R, 1999. "Time-on-the-Market as a Sign of Quality," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(3), pages 555-78, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Levin, Dan & Smith, James L, 1994. "Equilibrium in Auctions with Entry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 585-99, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. John G. Riley, 2001. "Silver Signals: Twenty-Five Years of Screening and Signaling," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(2), pages 432-478, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Maarten C. W. Janssen & José Luis Moraga-González, 2004. "Strategic Pricing, Consumer Search and the Number of Firms," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 71(4), pages 1089-1118, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Spence, A Michael, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-74, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Manelli, Alejandro M & Vincent, Daniel R, 1995. "Optimal Procurement Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(3), pages 591-620, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Clark, Derek J & Riis, Christian, 1998. "Competition over More Than One Prize," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 276-89, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Maarten C.W. Janssen, 2002. "Catching hipos: screening, wages, and competing for a job," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 54(2), pages 321-333, April.
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? All top Economics journals are listed on RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2008-7-23.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.