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Status-Seeking in Violent Subcultures and the Double Dividend of Zero-Tolerance

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Author Info
Robert Dur () (Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam)

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Abstract

This paper develops a model in which individuals gain social status among their peers for being 'tough' by committing violent acts. We show that a high penalty for moderately violent acts (zero-tolerance) may yield a double dividend in that it reduces both moderate and extreme violence. The reason is that a high penalty keeps relatively 'gutless' individuals from committing moderately violent acts, which raises the signaling value of that action, and thus makes it more attractive for otherwise extremely violent individuals. Conversely, a high penalty for extremely violent acts may backfire, as it induces relatively 'tough' individuals to commit moderately violent acts and so makes moderate violence more attractive for otherwise nonviolent individuals.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 06-005/1.

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Date of creation: 06 Jan 2006
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20060005

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Web page: http://www.tinbergen.nl/

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Related research
Keywords: status concerns; violence; subcultures; penalties; zero-tolerance; broken windows policing;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
K14 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Criminal Law
K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Ben Vollaard, 2006. "Evaluating the push for tougher, more targeted policing in the Netherlands; evidence from a citizen survey," CPB Documents 119, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis. [Downloadable!]
  2. Robert Dur, 2006. "Status-Seeking in Criminal Subcultures and the Double Dividend of Zero-Tolerance," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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