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Does Campaign Finance imply Political Favors?

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Author Info
Stijn Claessens () (World Bank)
Erik Feijen () (Universiteit van Amsterdam)
Luc Laeven (World Bank)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

See 'Political Connections And Preferential Access To Finance: The Role Of Campaign Contributions' in Journal of Financial Economics, 2008, 88(3), 554-580.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 06-002/2.

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Date of creation: 05 Jan 2006
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20060002

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Web page: http://www.tinbergen.nl/

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Related research
Keywords: Campaign Contributions; Elections; Corruption; Preferential Lending;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
G1 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets
G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
P48 - Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Other Economic Systems: Political Economy; Legal Institutions; Property Rights

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Kroszner, Randall S & Stratmann, Thomas, 1998. "Interest-Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services' Political Action Committees," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1163-87, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Mara Faccio, 2006. "Politically Connected Firms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 369-386, March. [Downloadable!]
  3. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 2001. "The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial Development in the 20th Century," NBER Working Papers 8178, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Seema Jayachandran, 2004. "The Jeffords Effect," UCLA Economics Online Papers 297, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1996. "Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 63(2), pages 265-86, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Raymond Fisman, 2001. "Estimating the Value of Political Connections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 1095-1102, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. A. Craig MacKinlay, 1997. "Event Studies in Economics and Finance," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(1), pages 13-39, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Daron Acemoglu, 2003. "The Form of Property Rights: Oligarchic vs. Democratic Societies," NBER Working Papers 10037, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Chappell, Henry W, Jr, 1982. "Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting: A Simultaneous Probit-Tobit Model," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 64(1), pages 77-83, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Stratmann, Thomas, 1995. "Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting: Does the Timing of Contributions Matter?," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 77(1), pages 127-36, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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