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Unionization Structure, Licensing and Innovation

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  • Arijit Mukherjee

    ()
    (University of Nottingham and The Leverhulme Centre for Research in Globalisation and Economic Policy, UK)

  • Enrico Pennings

    ()
    (Faculty of Economics, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, the Netherlands)

Abstract

This discussion paper led to a publication in the 'International Journal of Industrial Organization' , 29(2), 232-41. Taking technological differences between firms as given, we show that the technologically advanced firm has a stronger incentive for technology licensing under a decentralized unionization structure than with centralized wage setting. Furthermore, We show that, in presence of licensing, the incentive for innovation may also be stronger under decentralized unions. Unions have a clear preference for centralization only if productivity improvements are relatively small.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 05-109/4.

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Date of creation: 06 Dec 2005
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20050109

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Web page: http://www.tinbergen.nl

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Keywords: Licensing; downstream market; upstream market; innovation; welfare;

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References

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  2. Justus Haucap & Christian Wey, 2004. "Unionisation Structures and Innovation Incentives," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 398, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Matsushima, Noriaki & Mizuno, Tomomichi, 2012. "Profit-enhancing competitive pressure in vertically related industries," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 142-152.
  2. Nicola Meccheri & Luciano Fanti, 2012. "Managerial delegation under alternative unionization structures," Discussion Papers, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy 2012/138, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
  3. Sen, Neelanjan, 2014. "Technology Transfer and its effect on Innovation," MPRA Paper 55542, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Luciano Fanti & Nicola Meccheri, 2014. "Capacity choice and welfare under alternative unionisation structures," Discussion Papers, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy 2014/176, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
  5. Debasmita Basask, . "Price competition and the effects of labour union on process innovation," Discussion Papers 12/05, University of Nottingham, School of Economics.
  6. Maiti, Dibyendu & Mukherjee, Arijit, 2013. "Trade cost reduction, subcontracting and unionised wage," Labour Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 21(C), pages 103-110.
  7. Luciano Fanti & Nicola Meccheri, 2012. "Profits and competition in a unionized duopoly model with product differentiation and labour decreasing returns," Discussion Papers, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy 2012/133, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
  8. Debasmita Basak & Arijit Mukherjee, . "Unionisation structure and product innovation," Discussion Papers 11/12, University of Nottingham, School of Economics.
  9. Beatrice Pagel & Christian Wey, 2013. "Unionization Structures in International Oligopoly," LABOUR, CEIS, CEIS, vol. 27(1), pages 1-17, 03.

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