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Unionization Structure, Licensing and Innovation

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Author Info
Arijit Mukherjee () (University of Nottingham and The Leverhulme Centre for Research in Globalisation and Economic Policy, UK)
Enrico Pennings () (Faculty of Economics, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, the Netherlands)

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Abstract

Taking technological differences between firms as given, we show that the technologically advanced firm has a stronger incentive for technology licensing under a decentralized unionization structure than with centralized wage setting. Furthermore, We show that, in presence of licensing, the incentive for innovation may also be stronger under decentralized unions. Unions have a clear preference for centralization only if productivity improvements are relatively small.

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File URL: http://www.tinbergen.nl/discussionpapers/05109.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 05-109/4.

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Date of creation: 06 Dec 2005
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20050109

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Web page: http://www.tinbergen.nl/

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Related research
Keywords: Licensing downstream market upstream market innovation welfare

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
O34 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change - - - Intellectual Property Rights

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This page was last updated on 2008-5-14.


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