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On-the-Job Search and Sorting

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Author Info

  • Pieter A. Gautier

    ()
    (VU University Amsterdam)

  • Coen N. Teulings

    ()
    (SEO Economic Research, University of Amsterdam)

  • Aico van Vuuren

    ()
    (VU University Amsterdam)

Abstract

This paper characterizes the equilibrium for a large class of search models with two-sided heterogeneity and on-the-job search. Besides the well-known congestion externalities, we show that on-the-job search in combination with monopsonistic wage setting without commitment creates a "business-stealing" externality. In the absence of congestion effects, this leads to excessive vacancy creation. Under wage setting with commitment this externality is absent because when posting a wage, firms take into account the expected productivity of future workers in their current jobs. If firms are able to make and respond to counteroffers, then they will not have to pay no-quit premia and this also leads to excessive vacancy creation. See also 'On-The-Job Search, Mismatch and Efficiency' , 'Review of Economic Studies', 77(1), 245-72.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 05-070/3.

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Date of creation: 24 Jun 2005
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20050070

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Web page: http://www.tinbergen.nl

Related research

Keywords: assignment; on-the job search; wage bargaining; sorting;

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References

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  1. Marimon, R. & Zilibotti, F., 1998. "Unemployment vs. Mismatch of Talents," Papers 661, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
  2. Dixit, Avinash K & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1975. "Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 64, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  3. Gautier, Pieter A & Teulings, Coen N, 2003. "How Large are Search Frictions?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3861, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Marimon, Ramon & Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 1998. "Unemployment vs. Mismatch of Talents: Reconsidering Unemployment Benefits," Seminar Papers 661, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
  5. Moen, Espen R. & Rosén, Åsa, 2002. "Does poaching distort training?," Working Paper Series 4/2002, Swedish Institute for Social Research.
  6. Coen N. Teulings & Pieter A. Gautier, 2000. "The Right Man for the Job," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 00-038/3, Tinbergen Institute.
  7. Giuseppe Moscarini, 2005. "Job Matching and the Wage Distribution," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(2), pages 481-516, 03.
  8. Gadi Barlevy, 2002. "The Sullying Effect of Recessions," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 69(1), pages 65-96.
  9. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 252, David K. Levine.
  10. Jovanovic, Boyan, 1984. "Matching, Turnover, and Unemployment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(1), pages 108-22, February.
  11. Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-44, June.
  12. Kenneth Burdett & Dale T. Mortensen, 1989. "Equilibrium Wage Differentials and Employer Size," Discussion Papers 860, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  13. Postel-Vinay & Robin, 2002. "Equilibrium wage dispersion with worker and employer heterogeneity," Working Papers 155908, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, France.
  14. Jovanovic, Boyan, 1979. "Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(5), pages 972-90, October.
  15. Pissarides, Christopher A, 1994. "Search Unemployment with On-the-Job Search," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(3), pages 457-75, July.
  16. Shimer, Robert, 2006. "On-the-job search and strategic bargaining," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 811-830, May.
  17. Mortensen, Dale T & Pissarides, Christopher, 1999. "New Developments in Models of Search in the Labour Market," CEPR Discussion Papers 2053, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  18. Gautier, Pieter A, 2002. "Unemployment and Search Externalities in a Model with Heterogeneous Jobs and Workers," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 69(273), pages 21-40, February.
  19. Moscarini, Giuseppe, 2001. "Excess Worker Reallocation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(3), pages 593-612, July.
  20. Steven C. Salop, 1979. "Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 141-156, Spring.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Coen Teulings & Pieter A. Gautier, 2011. "Sorting and the output loss due to search frictions," 2011 Meeting Papers 169, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  2. Gadi Barlevy & H. N. Nagaraja, 2010. "Estimating Mobility Rates in Search Models with Initial Condition Problems," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 13(4), pages 780-799, October.
  3. Coen N. Teulings & P.A. Gautier, 2002. "Search and the City," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 02-061/3, Tinbergen Institute.
  4. Gadi Barlevy & H.N. Nagaraja, 2006. "Identification of Search Models with Initial Condition Problems," NBER Working Papers 12166, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Gautier, Pieter & Zenou, Yves, 2008. "Car Ownership and the Labor Market of Ethnic Minorities," IZA Discussion Papers 3814, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  6. Gautier, Pieter A & Teulings, Coen N, 2005. "How Large are Search Frictions?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5229, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Yale University & Rafael Lopes de Melo, 2008. "Assortative Matching in the Brazilian Labor Market," 2008 Meeting Papers 801, Society for Economic Dynamics.

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