Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

On the Size of the Winning Set in the Presence of Interest Groups

Contents:

Author Info

  • Vjollca Sadiraj

    ()
    (Economic Science Laboratory, University of Arizona, Tucson, USA)

  • Jan Tuinstra

    ()
    (CeNDEF, Faculty of Economics and Econometrics, Universiteit van Amsterdam)

  • Frans van Winden

    ()
    (CREED, Faculty of Economics and Econometrics, Universiteit van Amsterdam)

Abstract

Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that the presence of these interest groups increases the winning set, which is the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the incumbent. Therefore interest groups enhance the probability of the challenger winning the election.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://papers.tinbergen.nl/05034.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 05-034/1.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 06 Apr 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20050034

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.tinbergen.nl

Related research

Keywords: Spatial voting models; electoral competition; winning set; interest groups.;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Vjollca Sadiraj & Jan Tuinstra & Frans Winden, 2005. "Interest group size dynamics and policymaking," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 125(3), pages 271-303, December.
  2. Sadiraj, V. & Tuinstra, J. & Winden, F. van, 2004. "A Computational Electoral Competition Model with Social Clustering and Endogenous Interest Groups as Information Brokers," CeNDEF Working Papers, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance 04-08, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance.
  3. George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, 2000. "Economics And Identity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 115(3), pages 715-753, August.
  4. Kramer, Gerald H., 1977. "A dynamical model of political equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 310-334, December.
  5. Potters, J.J.M. & Sloof, R., 1996. "Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-73373, Tilburg University.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Sadiraj, V. & Tuinstra, J. & Winden, F. van, 2004. "A Computational Electoral Competition Model with Social Clustering and Endogenous Interest Groups as Information Brokers," CeNDEF Working Papers, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance 04-08, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20050034. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Antoine Maartens (+31 626 - 160 892)).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.