Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

• Pieter H.M. Ruys
• Rene van den Brink

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Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 05-020/1.

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Date of creation: 14 Feb 2005
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20050020

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Related research

Keywords: Optimal firm size; governance; hierarchy; internal organization structure; cooperative game; permission value; labor substitutability; general equilibrium;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure

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1. Maskin, Eric & Qian, Yingyi & Xu, Chenggang, 2000. "Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 67(2), pages 359-78, April.
   Other versions:
   • Eric Maskin & Yingyi Qian & Chenggang Xu, 1999. "Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form," Working Papers 99009, Stanford University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • Eric Maskin & Yingyi Qian & Chenggang Xu, 1997. "Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form," Working Papers 97034, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
2. Rothschild, R., 2001. "On the use of a modified Shapley value to determine the optimal size of a cartel," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 37-47, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 1998. "Power In A Theory Of The Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 113(2), pages 387-432, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Rajan, Raghuram G & Zingales, Luigi, 1998. "Power in a Theory of the Firm," CEPR Discussion Papers 1777, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, . "Power in a Theory of the Firm," CRSP working papers 335, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
   • Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 1997. "Power in a Theory of the Firm," NBER Working Papers 6274, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Teece, David J., 1996. "Firm organization, industrial structure, and technological innovation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 193-224, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 2001. "The Firm As A Dedicated Hierarchy: A Theory Of The Origins And Growth Of Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 116(3), pages 805-851, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 2000. "The Firm as a Dedicated Hierarchy: A Theory of the Origin and Growth of Firms," NBER Working Papers 7546, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Kessler, Anke S., 2000. "On Monitoring and Collusion in Hierarchies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 280-291, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-58, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1988. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Working papers 495, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
8. Ju, Y. & Borm, P.E.M. & Ruys, P.H.M., 2004. "The consensus value : a new solution concept for cooperative games," Discussion Paper 50, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Yuan Ju & Peter Borm & Pieter Ruys, 2007. "The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 28(4), pages 685-703, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1999. "Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(1), pages 83-114, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Maniquet, Francois, 2003. "A characterization of the Shapley value in queueing problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 109(1), pages 90-103, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Maniquet, F., 2000. "A Characterization of the Shapley Value in Queueing Problems," Papers 222, Notre-Dame de la Paix, Sciences Economiques et Sociales.
11. Ruys, P.H.M. & Brink, R. van den & Semenov, R., 1999. "Values and governance systems," Discussion Paper 66, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
12. Luis Garicano, 2000. "Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(5), pages 874-904, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
13. Sherwin Rosen, 1982. "Authority, Control, and the Distribution of Earnings," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 311-323, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
14. Yellen, Janet L, 1984. "Efficiency Wage Models of Unemployment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(2), pages 200-205, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
15. Alan Beggs, 2000. "Queues and Hierarchies," Economics Series Working Papers 034, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    Other versions:
    • Beggs, A., 2000. "Queues and Hierarchies," Economics Series Working Papers 9934, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    • Beggs, A W, 2001. "Queues and Hierarchies," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 68(2), pages 297-322, April.
16. Pekec, Aleksandar & Roberts, Fred S., 2001. "The role assignment model nearly fits most social networks," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 275-293, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
17. Michael Keren & David Levhari, 1983. "The Internal Organization of the Firm and the Shape of Average Costs," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 474-486, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
18. Prescott, Edward Simpson & Townsend, Robert M., 2002. "Collective Organizations versus Relative Performance Contracts: Inequality, Risk Sharing, and Moral Hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(2), pages 282-310, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
19. Qian, Yingyi, 1994. "Incentives and Loss of Control in an Optimal Hierarchy," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 61(3), pages 527-44, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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