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Axiomatizations of a Class of Equal Surplus Sharing Solutions for Cooperative Games with Transferable Utility

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Author Info
René van den Brink () (Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)
Yukihiko Funaki () (School of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University, Tokyo)
Abstract

A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A one-point solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. In this paper we discuss a class of solutions containing all convex combinations of the CIS-value, the ENSC-value, and the egalitarian solution. We characterize this class of solutions using a general standardness for two player games and reduced game consistency. Specific cases of these properties characterize specific solutions in this class.

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Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 04-136/1.

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Date of creation: 16 Dec 2004
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20040136

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Web page: http://www.tinbergen.nl/

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Related research
Keywords: TU-game Equal surplus sharing CIS-value ENSC-value Egalitarian solution Reduced Game Consistency

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Ju, Y. & Borm, P.E.M. & Ruys, P.H.M., 2004. "The consensus value : a new solution concept for cooperative games," Discussion Paper 50, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  2. René van den Brink, 2004. "Null or Zero Players: The Difference between the Shapley Value and the Egalitarian Solution," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-127/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  3. Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1989. "Potential, Value, and Consistency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 589-614, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Ju, Yuan & Wettstein, David, 2006. "Implementing cooperative solution concepts : a generalized bidding approach," Discussion Paper 42, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. René van den Brink & Yukihiko Funaki & Yuan Ju, 2007. "Consistency, Monotonicity and Implementation of Egalitarian Shapley Values," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 07-062/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
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