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Axiomatizations of a Class of Equal Surplus Sharing Solutions for Cooperative Games with Transferable Utility

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Author Info

  • René van den Brink

    ()
    (Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)

  • Yukihiko Funaki

    ()
    (School of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University, Tokyo)

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    Abstract

    A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A one-point solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. In this paper we discuss a class of solutions containing all convex combinations of the CIS-value, the ENSC-value, and the egalitarian solution. We characterize this class of solutions using a general standardness for two player games and reduced game consistency. Specific cases of these properties characterize specific solutions in this class.

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    File URL: http://papers.tinbergen.nl/04136.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 04-136/1.

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    Date of creation: 16 Dec 2004
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20040136

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    Web page: http://www.tinbergen.nl

    Related research

    Keywords: TU-game; Equal surplus sharing; CIS-value; ENSC-value; Egalitarian solution; Reduced Game Consistency;

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    References

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    1. Ju, Y. & Borm, P.E.M. & Ruys, P.H.M., 2007. "The consensus value: A new solution concept for cooperative games," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-195202, Tilburg University.
    2. Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1989. "Potential, Value, and Consistency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 589-614, May.
    3. Sergiu Hart, 2006. "Shapley Value," Discussion Paper Series dp421, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    4. Robert J. Weber, 1977. "Probabilistic Values for Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 471R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    5. Brink, J.R. van den, 1999. "An Axiomatization of the Shapley Value Using a Fairness Property," Discussion Paper 1999-120, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    6. René van den Brink, 2004. "Null or Zero Players: The Difference between the Shapley Value and the Egalitarian Solution," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-127/1, Tinbergen Institute.
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    Cited by:
    1. René van den Brink & Yukihiko Funaki & Yuan Ju, 2007. "Consistency, Monotonicity and Implementation of Egalitarian Shapley Values," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 07-062/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    2. Ju, Y. & Borm, P.E.M. & Ruys, P.H.M., 2007. "The consensus value: A new solution concept for cooperative games," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-195202, Tilburg University.
    3. Yuan Ju & David Wettstein, 2006. "Implementing Cooperative Solution Concepts: a Generalized Bidding Approach," Keele Economics Research Papers KERP 2006/06, Centre for Economic Research, Keele University.

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