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Demand Adjustment in Coalitional Games

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Author Info
Gerard van der Laan () (Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)
Vitaly Pruzhansky () (Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)

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Abstract

This paper associates a strategic n-person game with a given transferable utility game and studies its Nash equilibria. Strict equilibria in this model characterize those divisions of social surplus that can become conventions in the sense of Young (1993). It is shown that even in relatively simple games various inefficiencies can arise.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 04-121/1.

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Date of creation: 10 Nov 2004
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20040121

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Web page: http://www.tinbergen.nl/

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Related research
Keywords: Aspirations; bargaining set; core; von Neumann-Morgenstern vector; stable set;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Agastya, Murali, 1997. "Adaptive Play in Multiplayer Bargaining Situations," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 64(3), pages 411-26, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. William R. Zame & Michael Maschler & Elaine Bennett, 1998. "A Demand Adjustment Process," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 26(4), pages 423-438.
    Other versions:
  4. Bennett, Elaine & Zame, William R, 1988. "Bargaining in Cooperative Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 279-300.
  5. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Krishna, Vijay & Serrano, Roberto, 1996. "Multilateral Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 63(1), pages 61-80, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Bennett, E. & Van Damme, E., 1990. "Demand Commitment Bargaining: -The Case Of Apex Games," Papers 9062, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  8. Bennett, Elaine, 1997. "Multilateral Bargaining Problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 151-179, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-19.

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