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The Pro-collusive Effect of Increased Cartel Detection Probabilities

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Author Info
Jeroen Hinloopen () (Faculty of Economics and Econometrics, Universiteit van Amsterdam)

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Abstract

An increase in cartel discovery probability due to irregular price movements that result from cartel defection is shown to increase cartel stability as short-run defection profits are less likely to be earned.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 04-117/1.

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Date of creation: 03 Nov 2004
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20040117

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Related research
Keywords: cartel stability; detection probabilities; defection incentives;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Friedman, James W, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(113), pages 1-12, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Abrantes-Metz, Rosa M. & Froeb, Luke M. & Geweke, John & Taylor, Christopher T., 2006. "A variance screen for collusion," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 467-486, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. J. Hinloopen, 2003. "Cartel Stability with Time-dependent Detection Probabilities," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 03-104/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-10.

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