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Information Overload in Multi-Stage Selection Procedures

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  • Stefano Ficco

    ()
    (Faculty of Economics, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam)

  • Vladimir A. Karamychev

    ()
    (Faculty of Economics, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam)

Abstract

The paper studies information processing imperfections in a fully rational decision-making network. It is shown that imperfect information transmission and imperfect information acquisition in a multi-stage selection game yield information overload. The paper analyses the mechanisms responsible for a seeming bounded rational behavior of the network and shows their similarities and distinctions. Two special cases of filtering selection procedures are investigated, where the overload takes its most limiting forms. The model developed in the paper can be applied both to organizations and to individuals. It can serve as a rational foundation for bounded rationality.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 04-077/1.

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Date of creation: 09 Jul 2004
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20040077

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Web page: http://www.tinbergen.nl

Related research

Keywords: Screening; Multistage Selection; Information Overload; Bounded Rationality;

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References

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  1. Piccione, Michele & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1997. "The Absent-Minded Driver's Paradox: Synthesis and Responses," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 121-130, July.
  2. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1995. "On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 324-324, December.
  3. Itzhak Gilboa & David Schmeidler, 1992. "Additive Representation of Non-Additive Measures and the Choquet Integral," Discussion Papers 985, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  4. Ehud Kalai & William Stanford, 1986. "Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games," Discussion Papers 679, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  5. Jacoby, Jacob & Speller, Donald E & Berning, Carol A Kohn, 1974. " Brand Choice Behavior as a Function of Information Load: Replication and Extension," Journal of Consumer Research, University of Chicago Press, vol. 1(1), pages 33-42, June.
  6. Halpern, Joseph Y., 1997. "On Ambiguities in the Interpretation of Game Trees," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 66-96, July.
  7. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1986. "Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 83-96, June.
  8. Kenneth R. Mount & Stanley Reiter, 1990. "A Model of Computing with Human Agents," Discussion Papers 890, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  9. Abreu, Dilip & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1988. "The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(6), pages 1259-81, November.
  10. Lipman, Barton L., 1997. "More Absentmindedness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 97-101, July.
  11. Visser, Bauke, 2000. "Organizational communication structure and performance," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 231-252, June.
  12. Battigalli, Pierpaolo, 1997. "Dynamic Consistency and Imperfect Recall," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 31-50, July.
  13. Stefano Ficco, 2004. "Information Overload in Monopsony Markets," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-082/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  14. Tilman Börgers & Antonio J. Morales & Rajiv Sarin, 2004. "Expedient and Monotone Learning Rules," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(2), pages 383-405, 03.
  15. Barton L. Lipman, 1995. "Information Processing and Bounded Rationality: A Survey," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 28(1), pages 42-67, February.
  16. Gilboa, Itzhak, 1997. "A Comment on the Absent-Minded Driver Paradox," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 25-30, July.
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Cited by:
  1. Stefano Ficco, 2004. "Information Overload in Monopsony Markets," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-082/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  2. Stefano Ficco & Vladimir Karamychev, 2005. "Evaluation Problem versus Selection Problem in Organizational Structures," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 05-058/1, Tinbergen Institute.

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