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Information Overload in Multi-Stage Selection Procedures

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Author Info
Stefano Ficco () (Faculty of Economics, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam)
Vladimir A. Karamychev () (Faculty of Economics, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam)

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Abstract

The paper studies information processing imperfections in a fully rational decision-making network. It is shown that imperfect information transmission and imperfect information acquisition in a multi-stage selection game yield information overload. The paper analyses the mechanisms responsible for a seeming bounded rational behavior of the network and shows their similarities and distinctions. Two special cases of filtering selection procedures are investigated, where the overload takes its most limiting forms. The model developed in the paper can be applied both to organizations and to individuals. It can serve as a rational foundation for bounded rationality.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 04-077/1.

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Date of creation: 09 Jul 2004
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20040077

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Related research
Keywords: Screening; Multistage Selection; Information Overload; Bounded Rationality;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    Other versions:
  3. Stefano Ficco, 2004. "Information Overload in Monopsony Markets," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-082/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  4. Visser, Bauke, 2000. "Organizational communication structure and performance," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 231-252, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Barton L. Lipman, 1993. "Information Processing and Bounded Rationality : A Survey," Working Papers 872, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
    Other versions:
  10. Halpern, Joseph Y., 1997. "On Ambiguities in the Interpretation of Game Trees," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 66-96, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Battigalli, Pierpaolo, 1997. "Dynamic Consistency and Imperfect Recall," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 31-50, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Gilboa, Itzhak, 1997. "A Comment on the Absent-Minded Driver Paradox," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 25-30, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1986. "Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 83-96, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Kalai, Ehud & Stanford, William, 1988. "Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 397-410, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  16. Piccione, M. & Rubinstein, A., 1996. "The Absent Minded Driver's Paradox: Synthesis and Responses," Papers 39-96, Tel Aviv.
    Other versions:
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Stefano Ficco, 2004. "Information Overload in Monopsony Markets," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-082/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  2. Stefano Ficco & Vladimir Karamychev, 2005. "Evaluation Problem versus Selection Problem in Organizational Structures," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 05-058/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
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