Politicians' Motivation, Political Culture, and Electoral Competition

International Tax and Public Finance.

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Politicians' Motivation, Political Culture, and Electoral Competition

Author Info

Klaas J. Beniers () (Faculty of Economics, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam)
Robert Dur () (Faculty of Economics, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam)

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Abstract

This discussion paper has been published in International Tax and Public Finance.

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Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 04-065/1.

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Date of creation: 09 Jun 2004
Date of revision: 16 Aug 2005
Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20040065

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Article
- Klaas Beniers & Robert Dur, 2007. "Politicians’ motivation, political culture, and electoral competition," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 29-54, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Paper
- Klaas J. Beniers & Robert A. J. Dur, 2004. "Politicians’ Motivation, Political Culture, and Electoral Competition," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2004-08-23 (All new papers)
NEP-CDM-2004-08-23 (Collective Decision-Making)
NEP-POL-2004-08-23 (Positive Political Economics)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

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Sumon Majumdar & Sharun W. Mukand, 2004. "Policy Gambles," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(4), pages 1207-1222, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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- Kai Konrad, 2003. "Inverse Campaigning," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
Caselli, Francesco & Morelli, Massimo, 2004. "Bad politicians," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4), pages 759-782, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Daniel Diermeier & Michael Keane & Antonio Merlo, 2002. "A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers," PIER Working Paper Archive 04-037, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Sep 2004. [Downloadable!]
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- Daniel Diermeier & Michael Keane & Antonio Merlo, 2004. "A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers," Discussion Papers 1387, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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Other versions:
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Biglaiser, Gary & Mezzetti, Claudio, 1997. "Politicians' decision making with re-election concerns," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 425-447, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Panu Poutvaara & Tuomas Takalo, 2004. "Candidate Quality," Public Economics 0406009, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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- Panu Poutvaara & Tuomas Takalo, 2003. "Candidate Quality," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
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Dur, Robert A J, 2001. " Why Do Policy Makers Stick to Inefficient Decisions?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 107(3-4), pages 221-34, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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- Robert A.J. Dur, 1999. "Why Do Policy Makers Stick to Inefficient Decisions?," Public Economics 9906002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Klaas J. Beniers, 2005. "Party Governance and the Selection of Parliamentarians," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 05-080/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]

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