Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Incentives and Workers' Motivation in the Public Sector

Contents:

Author Info

  • Josse Delfgaauw

    ()
    (Faculty of Economics, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam)

  • Robert Dur

    ()
    (Faculty of Economics, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, and CESifo, Munich)

Abstract

Civil servants have a reputation for being lazy. However, people's personal experiences with civil servants frequently run counter to this stereotype. We develop a model of an economy in which workers differ in laziness and in public service motivation, and characterise optimal incentive contracts for public sector workers under different informational assumptions. When civil servants' effort is unverifiable, lazy workers find working in the public sector highly attractive and may crowd out dedicated workers. When effort is verifiable, a cost-minimising government optimally attracts dedicated workers as well as the economy's laziest workers by offering separating contracts, which are both distorted. This discussion paper has resulted in a publication in The Economic Journal .

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://papers.tinbergen.nl/04060.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 04-060/1.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 02 Jun 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20040060

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.tinbergen.nl

Related research

Keywords: Public Sector Labour Markets; Incentive Contracts; Work Ethics; Public Service Motivation;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Josse Delfgaauw & Robert A.J. Dur, 2002. "Signaling and Screening of Workers' Motivation," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 02-050/3, Tinbergen Institute, revised 04 Mar 2005.
  2. Boyer, Marcel, 2003. "Competition and the reform of incentive schemes in the regulated sector," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(7-8), pages 1353-1381, August.
  3. Caplan, Bryan, 2003. "Stigler-Becker versus Myers-Briggs: why preference-based explanations are scientifically meaningful and empirically important," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 391-405, April.
  4. Jeon, Doh-Shin & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1999. "The Efficient Mechanism for Downsizing the Public Sector," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 13(1), pages 67-88, January.
  5. Rama, Martin, 1999. "Public Sector Downsizing: An Introduction," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 13(1), pages 1-22, January.
  6. Glazer, Amihai, 2004. "Motivating devoted workers," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 427-440, March.
  7. Johnson, William R, 1978. "A Theory of Job Shopping," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 92(2), pages 261-78, May.
  8. Roland Benabou & Jean Tirole, 2003. "Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(3), pages 489-520, 07.
  9. Lazear, Edward P, 1986. "Salaries and Piece Rates," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(3), pages 405-31, July.
  10. Timothy Besley & Maitreesh Ghatak, 2003. "Competition and incentives with motivated agents," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 2202, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  11. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 630-49, November.
  12. James J. Heckman & Jeffrey A. Smith & Christopher Taber, 1996. "What Do Bureaucrats Do? The Effects of Performance Standards and Bureaucratic Preferences on Acceptance into the JTPA Program," NBER Working Papers 5535, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Josse Delfgaauw & Robert Dur, 2009. "From public monopsony to competitive market: more efficiency but higher prices," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 61(3), pages 586-602, July.
  14. Caroline Minter Hoxby, 1994. "Do Private Schools Provide Competition for Public Schools?," NBER Working Papers 4978, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  15. Preston, Anne E, 1989. "The Nonprofit Worker in a For-Profit World," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 7(4), pages 438-63, October.
  16. Moen, Espen R & Rosen, Asa, 2004. "Performance Pay and Adverse Selection," CEPR Discussion Papers 4511, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  17. Andrew Jenkins, 2001. "Companies use of psychometric testing and the changing demand for skills: A review of the literature," CEE Discussion Papers 0012, Centre for the Economics of Education, LSE.
  18. Francois, Patrick, 2000. "'Public service motivation' as an argument for government provision," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(3), pages 275-299, November.
  19. Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March.
  20. Andrew Jenkins, 2001. "Companies use of psychometric testing and the changing demand for skills: a review of the literature," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 19541, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  21. John G. Riley, 2001. "Silver Signals: Twenty-Five Years of Screening and Signaling," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(2), pages 432-478, June.
  22. Emanuela Antonazzo & Anthony Scott & Diane Skatun & Robert. F. Elliott, 2003. "The labour market for nursing: a review of the labour supply literature," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 12(6), pages 465-478.
  23. Richard Vedder & Joshua Hall, 2000. "Private School Competition and Public School Teacher Salaries," Journal of Labor Research, Transaction Publishers, vol. 21(1), pages 162-168, January.
  24. Spence, A Michael, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-74, August.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20040060. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Antoine Maartens (+31 626 - 160 892)).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.