Policy Makers, Advisors, and Reputation
AbstractWhen hiring an adviser (he), a policy maker (she) often faces the problem that she has incomplete information about his preferences. Some advisers are good, in the sense that their preferences are closely aligned to the policy maker's preferences, and some advisers are bad. Recently, some scholars have argued that the policy maker's power to replace her adviser induces the adviser to act more in line with the policy maker's interests. The idea is that the adviser's desire to put a stamp on future policy reduces his incentive to manipulate information. This paper shows that the policy maker's power to replace her adviser may harm her. The reason is that this power may have an adverse effect on the behavior of good advisers.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 04-037/1.
Date of creation: 30 Mar 2004
Date of revision: 09 Dec 2004
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Reputation; Signalling; Uncertainty; Policy decision-making;
Other versions of this item:
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-04-25 (All new papers)
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