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Credit Rationing Effects of Credit Value-at-Risk

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Author Info
Jan Frederik Slijkerman () (Faculty of Economics, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam)
David J.C. Smant () (Faculty of Economics, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam)
Casper G. de Vries () (Faculty of Economics, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam)

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Abstract

Banks provide risky loans to firms which have superior information regarding the quality of their projects. Due to asymmetric information the banks face the risk of adverse selection. Credit Value-at-Risk (CVaR) regulation counters the problem of low quality, i.e. high risk, loans and therefore reduces the risk of the bank loan portfolio. However, CVaR regulation distorts the operation of credit markets. We show that a binding CVaR constraint introduces credit rationing and lowers social welfare. CVaR regulation also affects the operation of monetary policy.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 04-032/2.

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Date of creation: 15 Mar 2004
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20040032

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Related research
Keywords: Credit rationing; Credit Value-at-Risk; asymmetric information; banks; regulation; loans;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Rationing; Licensing
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Determination of Interest Rates; Term Structure of Interest Rates
G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Mortgages

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Mankiw, N Gregory, 1986. "The Allocation of Credit and Financial Collapse," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(3), pages 455-70, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Steven A. Sharpe, 1995. "Bank capitalization, regulation, and the credit crunch: a critical review of the research findings," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 95-20, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  3. Bernanke, Ben & Gertler, Mark, 1995. "Inside the Black Box: The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission," Working Papers 95-15, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Frederic S. Mishkin, 1996. "The Channels of Monetary Transmission: Lessons for Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 5464, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Jaffee, Dwight M & Russell, Thomas, 1976. "Imperfect Information, Uncertainty, and Credit Rationing," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 651-66, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Jeremy C. Stein, 1998. "An Adverse-Selection Model of Bank Asset and Liability Management with Implications for the Transmission of Monetary Policy," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(3), pages 466-486, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Williamson, Stephen D., 1986. "Costly monitoring, financial intermediation, and equilibrium credit rationing," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 159-179, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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