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The Effects of Learning in Interactive Monetary Policy Committees

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  • Jan Marc Berk

    ()
    (Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, and De Nederlandsche Bank, Amsterdam)

  • Beata K. Bierut

    ()
    (Faculty of Economics, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, and De Nederlandsche Bank, Amsterdam)

Abstract

We develop a theoretical framework for studying the effects of interaction on the quaJity of decision-making by monetary policy committees. We show that interaction, i.e. increasing one's expertise through an exchange of views, is most likely not to result in interdependent voting behaviour.Therefore, and in contrast to earlier literature, we find that interaction is beneficial for the collective outcome.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 04-029/2.

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Date of creation: 09 Mar 2004
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20040029

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Keywords: Monetary policy; interest rates; learning;

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  1. Marvin Goodfriend, 2000. "The role of a regional bank in a system of central banks," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Win, pages 7-25.
  2. Süppel, Ralph & von Hagen, Jürgen, 1994. "Central Bank Constitutions for Monetary Unions," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 919, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Anne Sibert, 2003. "Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective Reputations," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(3), pages 649-665, 07.
  4. Carsten Hefeker, 2001. "Federal Monetary Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series 422, CESifo Group Munich.
  5. Otto H. Swank & Phongthorn Wrasai, 2002. "Deliberation, Information Aggregation and Collective Decision Making," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 02-006/1, Tinbergen Institute, revised 03 Dec 2002.
  6. von Hagen, Jurgen & Suppel, Ralph, 1994. "Central bank constitutions for federal monetary unions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(3-4), pages 774-782, April.
  7. Lombardelli, Clare & James Proudman & James Talbot, 2003. "Committees versus individuals: an experimental analysis of monetary policy decision-making," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003, Royal Economic Society 142, Royal Economic Society.
  8. Alan S. Blinder & John Morgan, 2001. "Are Two Heads Better Than One?: An Experimental Analysis of Group vs. Individual Decisionmaking," Working Papers 130, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
  9. Clare Lombardelli & James Proudman & James Talbot, 2002. "Committees versus individuals: an experimental analysis of monetary policy decision-making," Bank of England working papers 165, Bank of England.
  10. Alan S. Blinder, 1999. "Central Banking in Theory and Practice," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262522608, December.
  11. Berk, J.M. & Bierut, B.K., 2003. "Committee structure and its implications for monetary policy decision-making," Serie Research Memoranda 0006, VU University Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Econometrics.
  12. Gradstein, Mark & Nitzan, Shmuel & Paroush, Jacob, 1990. " Collective Decision Making and the Limits on the Organization's Size," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 66(3), pages 279-91, September.
  13. Belden, Susan, 1989. "Policy Preferences of FOMC Members as Revealed by Dissenting Votes," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 21(4), pages 432-41, November.
  14. Sen, Amartya K, 1977. "Social Choice Theory: A Re-examination," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 45(1), pages 53-89, January.
  15. Ladha, Krishna K., 1995. "Information pooling through majority-rule voting: Condorcet's jury theorem with correlated votes," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 353-372, May.
  16. Gildea, John A, 1992. "The Regional Representation of Federal Reserve Bank Presidents," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 24(2), pages 215-25, May.
  17. Ben-Yashar, Ruth C & Nitzan, Shmuel I, 1997. "The Optimal Decision Rule for Fixed-Size Committees in Dichotomous Choice Situations: The General Result," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 38(1), pages 175-86, February.
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Cited by:
  1. Berger, Helge & Nitsch, Volker & Lybek, Tonny, 2008. "Central Bank boards around the world: why does membership size differ?," Discussion Papers 2008/5, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
  2. Berger, Helge, 2005. "Optimal central bank design: benchmarks for the ECB," Discussion Papers 2005/27, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
  3. Helge Berger & Volker Nitsc, 2011. "Too Many Cooks? Committees in Monetary Policy," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 78(2), pages 452-475, October.
  4. Helge Berger & Tonny Lybek & Volker Nitsch, 2006. "Central Bank Boards Around the World," IMF Working Papers 06/281, International Monetary Fund.

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