Network Formation under Heterogeneous Costs: The Multiple Group Model
AbstractIt is widely recognized that the shape of networks influences both individual and aggregate behavior. This raises the question which types of networks are likely to arise. Our paper fits into the literature that addresses this question. The paper continues on the work of Galeotti, Goyal and Kamphorst (2003). In their paper they investigate a model of network formation, where players are divided into groups. The costs of a link between any pair of players are increasing in the distance between the groups that these players belong to. They apply the solution concept of minimal curb sets to the case of two groups. In this paper we give a full characterization of the networks induced by a minimal curb set for any number of groups. To do so, we show that in our multiple group model each minimal curb set is a so-called super-tight curb set, that is a minimal curb set satisfying the condition that in each state of the set every player has the same best reply. From the proof it follows that every recurrent class of an unperturbed best reply dynamics is a minimal (super-tight) curb set and reversely. From this result we obtain the characterization of the types of networks that may arise in a minimal curb set. We show that such networks may have features that can not occur in networks with at most two groups. Nevertheless, local centrality and center-sponsorship are still important characteristics of the networks in minimal curb sets.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 04-006/1.
Date of creation: 13 Jan 2004
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network formation; curb sets;
Other versions of this item:
- Jurjen Kamphorst & Gerard Van Der Laan, 2007. "Network Formation Under Heterogeneous Costs: The Multiple Group Model," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 9(04), pages 599-635.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-04-25 (All new papers)
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- K. De Jaegher & J.J.A. Kamphorst, 2010.
"Two-way Flow Networks with Small Decay,"
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
10-125/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- K. De Jaegher & J.J.A. Kamphorst, 2010. "Two-way Flow Networks with Small Decay," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 10-125/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- K.J.M. De Jaegher & J.J.A. Kamphorst, 2008. "Network formation with decreasing marginal benefits of information," Working Papers 08-16, Utrecht School of Economics.
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