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Maximin Play in Two-Person Bimatrix Games

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Author Info
Vitaly Pruzhansky () (Faculty of Economics and Business Adminstration, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)
Abstract

Since the seminal paper of Nash (1950) game theoretic literature has focused mostly on equilibrium and not on maximin (minimax) strategies. We study the properties of these strategies in 2-player non-zero-sum strategic games, whose Nash equilibria are only mixed.

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Paper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 03-101/1.

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Date of creation: 19 Dec 2003
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20030101

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Related research
Keywords: Non-cooperative games

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Aumann, Robert J., 1974. "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 67-96, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1007-28, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Marinacci, Massimo, 2000. "Ambiguous Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 191-219, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Vitaly Pruzhansky, 2004. "A Discussion of Maximin," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-028/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
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