Optimal Environmental Policy Differentials under Emissions Constraints
AbstractIs there a case to be made for preferential treatment of the exposed sector in an economy when compliance to an aggregate emissions constraint induced by an international environmental agreement is mandatory? This question is being debated in many countries, including The Netherlands, in the context of the implementation of the Kyoto protocol. We address this issue in a general equilibrium framework in this paper, and theoretically cover several market structures, including perfect competition, oligopoly and the large country case. Our main finding is that in many circumstances preferential treatment is not warranted from the point of view of maximizing social welfare.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tinbergen Institute in its series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers with number 03-080/3.
Date of creation: 06 Oct 2003
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.tinbergen.nl
ecological dumping; general equilibrium; emissions constraints; Kyoto protocol;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
- F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
- Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Richard Nahuis & Paul Tang, 2005. "Environmental policy competition and differential tax treatment; a case for tighter coordination?," CPB Discussion Paper 50, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Antoine Maartens (+31 626 - 160 892)).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.